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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The  worldwide  stockmarket  crash  that  took  place  on  October  19th,  1987 
threw  financial  markets  into  turmoil,  brought  to  a  head  international 
disagreements  about  the  appropriate  direction  of  economic  policies,  and 
precipitated  fears  of  a  re-run  of  the  Great  Depression  of  the  thirties. 
Coming  on  top  of  the  already  horrendously  high  unemployment  levels  within 
the  European Community,  a  major  downturn  in activity at this juncture would 
have  been  disastrous.  Fortunately  economic  indicators  do  not  seem  to 
suggest  that economic  activity has  slowed markedly.  However  that  does  not 
imply  all  is  well  for  imbalances  remain  in  the  world  economy  and  the 
necessary adjustment process  may  yet provoke  a  major  recession.  This  paper 
first of all looks at why  the direct consequences  of the crash  seem  to  have 
been  so  mild,  and  then  goes  on  to  look  at  the  continued  need  for  policy 
adjustment  and  the  prospects  for  avoiding  a  recession  in  the  European 
Community. 
To  preview  the  conclusions,  we  argue  that  the  stock  market  collapse 
probably  did  not  signal  any  fundamental  change  in  the  prospects  for  the 
industrialised  economies,  but  rather  represented  the  ending  of  a 
speculative  "bubble".  As  such  its  direct  impact  on  activity  could  be 
expected  to  be  quite  small  although  increased  uncertainty  and  perverse 
policy  decisions  could  have  led  to - a  collapse  in  investment.  It  is 
becoming  increasingly clear that  there  is unlikely  to  be  a  major  recession 
in  the  United  States  in  the  immediate  future,  because  monetary  expansion 
and  dollar  depreciation  have  provided  an  offsetting  stimulus  to  any 
deflationary  effects  of  the  crash  and  there  is  no  sign  of  fiscal -2-
retrenchment.  By  contrast,  the  European  economies  have  been hit by  a  twin 
deflationary  shock  due  in small part to  the  fall  in equity prices  and  more 
particularly  to  the  appreciation  of  their  currencies  against  the  dollar. 
However,  the  overall  impact  of  this  shock  is  really  quite  modest.  The 
greatest  danger  at  the  present  juncture  is  that  the  major  European 
economies  will  pursue  procyclical policies  aimed  at achieving  given budget 
deficit and current account  targets  thus  amplifying  the original  shock.  In 
the  medium-term  some  action  will  need  to  be  taken  to  close  the  American 
budget deficit.  However,  a  "scissoring"  of fiscal policy,  with  a  reduction 
of  the  American  budget  deficit  and  an  increase  elsewhere,  will  do  very 
little to  eliminate  the  present current account  imbalances.  A  further  real 
depreciation  of  the  dollar  is  probably  also  required  (imparting  a  further 
deflationary  shock  to  the  Community).  For  this  reason  Europe  should  not 
seek  to  stabilise  exchange  rates  with  the  dollar,  but  allow  it to  drift 
downwards  as  required.  At  the  same  time  depreciation  of  the  European 
currencies  against  the  Yen  and  the  NICs  is  warranted  to  help  limit  the 
deterioration in competitiveness.  European governments  should also  seek  to 
offset  the  deflationary  shock  by  increasing  internally  generated  demand 
growth  through  the  adoption  of  supply-friendly  fiscal  policies.  Such 
fiscal measures  would also allow governments  to  simultaneously attack their 
economies'  structural problems. 
The  remainder  of  this  section  reviews  the  global  economic  situation, 
discusses  the  causes  of  the  crash,  and  assesses  its  quantitative 
significance for  demand.  Section  2  discuses  the medium-term  adjustments  in 
economic  policies  and  real  exchange  rates  that  are  necessary  if  a  more 
satisfactory pattern of current  accounts  is  to  be  established.  Section  3 
discusses  policy  options  within  Europe  and  the  need  for  intra-European 
co-operation  if recession  is  to  be  avoided.  This  section  also  discusses -3-
the  appropriate  role  of  monetary  and  exchange  rate  policy. 
concludes. 
1.1  THE  GLOBAL  CONTEXT 
Section  4 
Before discussing the  causes  and consequences  of the  stock market  crash 
in  detail,  it  is  worth  first  summarising  briefly  the  global  economic 
situation in 1987.  This  was  characterised by  continued economic  growth  and 
falling unemployment  in the United States,  accompanied by  a  continuation of 
the  large  (federal)  budget  and  current  account  deficits.  The  counterpart 
to  these  current  account  deficits was  to  be  found  primarily  in Japan,  West 
Germany  and  the  Newly  Industrialised  Countries,  especially  Korea  and 
Taiwan.  Growth  was  steady  in Japan but  generally sluggish  in  the  European 
Community  where  unemployment,  with  the  exception  of  the  United  Kingdom, 
fell  little.  Real  interest  rates  remained  high  and  the  debt  problems  of 
the  developing  countries  continued  to  cause  concern.  However,  after  the 
marked  decline  of  the  dollar  in  1986,  exchange  rates  between  the  major 
currencies  had  generally  remained  fairly  stable until  the  renewed  downward 
plunge  in the  dollar at the  end of the year. 
These  features  are  summarised  in  Tables  1  (budget  deficits)  and  2 
(current  accounts  and  exchange  rates).  Table  1  reports  the  general 
government  budget  surplus,  as  a  percentage  of  GNP/GDP,  together  with  the 
OECD's  estimate of the  cumulated change  in the underlying structural budget 
surplus  for  each  of  the  major  countries.  By  stripping  out  the  endogenous 
changes  in taxes  and  transfers  due  to variations  in  the  level  of activity 
this provides  a  crude  measure  of the  exogenous  changes  in  the  government's 
taxation and spending program.  It should be  emphasised,  however,  that this 
is  not  a  good  measure  of  fiscal  impact,  nor  is  there  any  reason  for 
supposing that it should be  stabilised over  the cycle.l  It simply provides -4-
a  crude  summary  of autonomous  changes  in fiscal policy which  may  themselves 
be  a  reaction to  economic  circumstances. 
Also  included  in  Table  1  is  the  private  sector  savings  ratio.  Two 
features  are  immediately  worth  noting.  First,  the  focus  on  the  United 
States  Federal  budget  deficit  is  misplaced.  State  and  local  government 
have been running  surpluses  and  the  current level of the  general  government 
deficit  is  not,  in  fact,  out  of  line  with  the  OECD  average.  Rather  the 
problem  lies  with  the  relatively  low  private  savings  rate  in  the  United 
States  coupled  with  the  marked  deterioration  in  the  general  government 
deficit  (both  actual  and  structural)  since  1980.  The  consequent  need  to 
finance  the  gap  between  the  demand  for  funds  by  the  government,  and  by 
firms  for  investment,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  domestically  generated 
supply of savings  on  the  other has,  in turn necessitated inflows  of capital 
from  abroad and,  as  a  counterpart,  a  current account deficit. 
This  current  account  deficit  (as  a  percentage  of  GNP/GDP),  and  the 
counterpart surpluses elsewhere  in the world,  appear  in Table  2,  along with 
associated  effective  exchange  rates.  It is  apparent  that  the  decline  in 
the dollar  in 1986  had very little effect  on  the  size  of  the United States 
current  account  deficit  in  1987  and  recent  statistics  are  only  slightly 
more  hopeful  in  this  regard.  We  shall  expand  below  on  why  further 
realignments  of  real  exchange  rates  are  required,  as  well  as  changes  in 
fiscal  policy  in both  the  United  States  and  the  European  Community,  if a 
more  satisfactory pattern of  current  accounts  is  to  be  achieved  without  a 
major disruption in activity. 
Of  course,  the  Louvre  Accord,  as  well  as  signalling  a  commitment  to 
stabilise  exchange  rates,  also  contained  statements  about  intentions  on 
fiscal  policy.  In particular  the United States  was  expected  to  take  steps 
to  reduce  its budget  deficit while  its  trading partners,  especially  Japan !) 
-5-
and  West  Germany  were  supposed  to  increase  theirs.  Although  this  could 
not,  of  itself  lead  to  an  immediate  and  significant  reduction  in  trade 
imbalances  it  was  hoped  that  the  signal  that  fiscal  rebalancing  was 
underway  would  have  beneficial  expectational  effects  and  stabilise  the 
exchange  markets.  While  the  Accord  contained  no  specific  fiscal 
commitments,  there  was  some  action  in Japan where  the  government  announced 
a  6  trillion yen  (about  1~  per  cent  of  GNP)  package  of  increased  spending 
and  reduced  taxes,  and  also  in  Europe,  with  West  Germany  declaring  its 
intention of bringing forward  the  5  billion mark  tax cut scheduled for  1990 
to  supplement  those  already scheduled in the  second phase  of the  tax reform 
and  the United Kingdom  pressing ahead with  already  scheduled  tax cuts.  As 
the  changes  in  the  structural  budget  surplus  appearing  in  Table  1  make 
clear,  however,  these  movements  in  fiscal  stance  were  relatively  modest. 
Surprisingly  the  figures  suggest  a  marked  movement  in  a  restrictive 
direction  in  1987  in  the  United  States,  but  this  is  misleading  since  the 
figures  include  certain  non-recurring  revenue  effects  from  tax  reform. 
Overall  the  picture  is  one  of  rather  limited  discretionary  changes  in 
fiscal policy in 1987. 
It is  instructive  to  record how  this  continuing  gap  between  the  demand 
for,  and  supply of,  savings  in the  United States was  met,  because it has  a 
bearing  on  the  sustainability  of  the  present  global  monetary  and  fiscal 
policy mix.  Until  1986  optimistic expectations,  interest and  exchange  rate 
developments,  changing US  attitudes  to  foreign  investment,  and  a  thirst for 
diversified US  assets  on the part of the major  surplus countries of the  Far 
East  meant  that  the  current  account  deficit  was  financed  entirely  by 
private  capital  flows.  This  was  firstly  through  US  banks,  subsequently 
through  securities,  particularly  Treasury  and  Eurobonds.  Finally  in  the 
first half of  1987  direct  investment  in equities  and  real  estate  became  a -6-
major  feature.  However,  in  1986  and  especially  in  the  first half of  1987 
official  financing  played  an  important  role.  In  1986  official  finance, 
primarily  increased  US  liabilities  to  foreign  monetary  authorities  rather 
than  a  rundown  of holdings  of  foreign  assets,  covered  around  a  quarter  of 
the  current account deficit.  In the first half of 1987  this  rose  to nearly 
40  per  cent,  reflecting  massive  official  intervention  during  April  to 
suppoLt  the  dollar under  the  Louvre  Accord  as private capital  inflows  dried 
up.  It  then  fell  back  abruptly  in  the  third  quarter  as  private  capital 
inflows  resumed.  However,  these  figures  understate  the  role  of  official 
intervention  in  the  financing  of  the  current  account  deficit  because 
investments  by  foreign  central  banks  in  the  Eurodollar  market  will  be 
recorded  as  private  rather  than official capital  inflows.  The  counterpart 
of  this  intervention  was  an  iucrease  in  the  reserves  of  the  surplus 
countries  with  official  flows  representing  70  per  cent  and  50  per  cent  of 
the  current account  surpluses  in Japan and West  Germany  respectively in the 
first half of  the  year.  Given  central bank  statements  that  G-10  countries 
had  undertaken  foreign  exchange  intervention of  70  billion dollars  between 
January  and  May  of  1987,  it seems  quite  possible  that  intervention by  the 
major  central  banks  could  be  responsible  for  financing  virtually  all  the 
United States current account deficit in the first part of the year. 
On  the  face  of  it  these  reserve  flows  do  not  seem  to  have  been 
sterilised2 by  the  authorities  since  in Germany  and  Japan  they  resulted  in 
growth  in  the  monetary  aggregates  above  the  top  of  their  target  ranges. 
Thus  by  September  1987  broad money  (M2  and  CD's)  in Japan was  growing at an 
annual  rate  of  around  14  per  cent,  compared  to  a  target  rate  of  10  per 
cent,  while  in Germany  the  rate of growth  of Central  Bank  Money  was  around 
7 ~  per  cent  compared  to  a  target  range  of  3-6  per  cent.  This  provoked 
fears  of  a  resurgence  of  inflation,  perhaps  justified  in  Japan,  but -7-
probably  overstated  in  Germany  for  two  reasons.  First,  growth  there  had 
been  sluggish  and  there  seemed  little  immediate  danger  of  demand 
outstripping supply.  Second,  the process  of disinflation could be  expected 
to  lead  to  an  increase  in  the  demand  for  real  money  balances  and  hence  a 
fall  in velocity.  The  unexpectedly  rapid  monetary  growth  therefore  need 
not  be  associated  with  an  acceleration  in  the  rate  of  growth  of  nominal 
demand.  In  any  case,  the  increasingly  apparent  conflict  between  domestic 
monetary  objectives  and  the  aim  of  stabilising  exchange  rates  came  to  a 
head  in  September  and  early October  as  the  dollar  weakened  in  the  face  of 
continuing  poor  American  trade  figures.  The  Bundesbank  maintained  a  firm 
stance on interest rates,  raising money  market  rates slightly.  At  the  same 
time  the  American  administration  were  concerned  that  growth  might  be 
slackening  and  so  were  unwilling  to  see  domestic  interest  rates  rise 
further  in  defence  of  the  dollar.  The  resulting  public  disagreement 
between  the  Secretary to  the  US  Treasury,  James  Baker,  and  representatives 
of the  Bundesbank signalled the final  demise  of the  Louvre  Accord  and upset 
the  already nervous  financial markets. 
As  explained  below,  we  believe  the  public  disagreement  over  the 
direction  of  macroeconomic  policies  in  general,  and  monetary  policies  in 
particular,  may  have  been  a  proximate  cause  of  the  stock  market  crash but 
cannot  explain  the  size  of  the  fall.  However,  the  experience  does  provide 
a  simple  but  important  lesson  for  future  attempts  to  stablise  exchange 
rates:  namely  that  in  a  world  of  highly  mobile  capital  exchange  rate 
stabilisation can only be  successful  so  long  as  governments  are willing  to 
pursue  the necessary supporting fiscal  and monetary policies.  Although  the 
Louvre  Accord  contained  statements  about  the  direction  that  fiscal  policy 
should take  in the major  OECD  economies,  there were  no  explicit commitments 
and  it  is  clear  that  governments  still  disagreed  on  where  the  primary -8-
burden  of  action  lay  and/or  were  unwilling  to  take  such  action  when  it 
conflicted with  the  pursuit  of  domestic  objectives.  Thus  in  the  face  of 
continuing  current  account  deficits  in  the  United  States  and  counterpart 
surpluses  in  Japan  and  Germany  (as  well  as  the  NICs)  and  only  limited 
fiscal  action  to  redress  these,  monetary  movements  became  the  prime 
mechanism  for  equilibrating the  world  economy  - as  under  a  classical  fixed 
rate  system  - leading  to  contractionary pressures  in the  United  States  and 
expansionary  ones  in  the  rest  of  the  world.  With  the  American  government 
concerned about maintaining growth,  and  inflation remaining  a  major  concern 
to  policy-makers  in Germany  and  Japan,  the  maintenance  of  a  stable  dollar 
ceased to be viable. 
1.2  THE  STOCK  MARKET  CRASH:  FUNDAMENTALS  OR  BUBBLE? 
The  crash of 19th October  1987 at a  stroke  reduced  the valuation of  the 
world's  stock of equity by  around  a  quarter- a  fall of roughly  1~ trillion 
dollars  - with  all  markets  experiencing  falls  of  similar  magnitude  (see 
Table  3).  However,  the  decline  is  less  spectacular  when  looked  at  over  a 
longer  time  frame.  While  the  French  and  Italian stock markets  were  30  per 
cent  lower,  and  Germany  40  per  cent  lower,  at  the  end  of  1987  than at  the 
beginning,  the  valuation  of  American  and  British  equity  was  virtually 
unchanged  over  the  whole  year  while  the  Japanese  market  was  some  15  per 
cent  higher.  Overall  world  stock  market  valuation  was  still  some  ~ 
trillion dollars  higher  at  the  end  of  1987  than  at  the  beginning.  What 
could have  caused such violent fluctuations  in such  a  short period of  time? 
One  view would  suggest that these  movements  simply reflect the variation in 
underlying fundamentals  - expectations of future profitability and discount 
rates.  At  the  opposite  extreme  is  the  view,  exemplified  by  the  Reagan 
administration,  that it was  an unwarranted fluctuation largely unrelated to -9-
economic  events  and  greatly  exacerbated  by  the  operation  of  portfolio 
insurance  schemes,  programmed  trading  rules  and  a  herd  instinct  amongst 
traders. 
Is  it reasonable  to  attribute  the  crash  to  fundamentals?  Traditional 
finance  theory  suggests  the  real  share  price  should  simply  equal  the 
present value of the  stream of real  (after-tax)  dividends,  i.e.  profits net 
of investment  and borrowing.  In that case  a  25  per cent  fall  in the  stock 
market  could  be  triggered  by  either  a  permanent  fall  of  25  per  cent  in 
expected  future  dividends,  or  a  permanent  rise  of  25  per  cent  in  the 
interest rate used  to  discount  these  profits,  or  a  suitable  combination  of 
the  two.  In the  case  of a  rise  in the  discount rate,  this  could be  due  to 
either  a  rise  in  the  rate  of return  on  safe  assets,  or  a  rise  in the  risk 
premium  on equity earnings. 
The  question of whether share prices accurately reflect fundamentals  is 
still  a  matter  of  dispute.  The  fact  that  stock  prices  fluctuate  widely 
while  dividends  vary  very  little  seems  to  constitute  a  prima  facie  case 
against  the  fundamentalist  viewpoint.3  However,  this  is  not  incompatible 
with  the  fundamentalist  view  if  the  underlying  process  determining  the 
market  value  of  the  company  i.e.  profits  net  of  investment,  is  a 
sufficiently volatile  series  and  managers  deliberately  smooth  dividends  by 
varying  retained  earningsfborrowing.4  On  balance  the  literature  is 
probably  not  very  favourable  to  the  idea  that  stock  prices  are  determined 
solely by  fundamentals,  but it cannot be  dismissed out of hand.  Instead we 
must  see  if  the  model  can  provide  a  plausible  account  of  what  actually 
happened. 
The  fundamentalist  explanation  of  the  volatility of  equity  prices  and 
the  simultaneous  smoothness  of  dividends  requires  not  only  that  the 
underlying  profits-net-of-investment  process  is  very  volatile,  but  also -10-
that  fluctuations  persist.  (If  shocks,  however  large,  were  purely 
temporary  they  could have  only  a  very  limited effect  on  the  price  because 
it is  a  weighted average  of a  whole  stream of future net profits.)  Whether 
this  is  indeed  the  case  has  been at  the  core  of  recent  empirical  debates. 
The  idea  that  shocks  to  company  fortunes  may  persist  indefinitely  seems 
reasonable at the  level of the  individual enterprise.  After all  some  firms 
turn out  to be  successes  and can continue  to  grow  almost  indefinitely while 
others  end  up  as  failures  and  disappear without  trace  - there  is  no  reason 
to  expect  any  necessary  tendency  to  return  to  a  common  level  of 
performance.  However,  it is  much  less  plausible  to  assume  such  long-lived 
persistence  at  an  economy-wide  level  where  differences  in  individual 
performance  wash  out.  Although  the profit rate can  show quite  long-lasting 
deviations  in response  to  changes  in activity,  historically the profit rate 
in most  countries  tends  to  revert over  time  to  a  fairly constant underlying 
level. 5  Consequently  fluctuations  in  the  profit  rate  cannot  be  truly 
permanent.  Similarly,  in  the  long  run,  the  real  interest  rate  also  seems 
to  revert  to  a  roughly  constant  underlying  level.  It follows  that  it is 
extremely  unlikely  that  a  truly  permanent  downward  assessment  of  future 
profitability or  a  truly  permanent  upward  shift  in real  expected  interest 
rates  occurred.  The  required  revisions  in  expected  profits  and  interest 
rates  in  the  near  future  would  then  need  to  be  even  larger  than  25  per 
cent.  Thus  if  we  start  from  an  initial  stationary  state  with  a  real 
discount rate of  5  per cent per  annum,  and  the  downward  revision in profits 
were  expected  to  last  for  five  years  only,  we  would  require  a  massive  115 
per  cent  downward  re-estimate  of  expected  profits  in  that  five  years  to 
rationalise  a  25  per cent fall in the market value! 
Is  there  any  event  which  could  rationalise  a  re-evaluation of economic 
prospects  on  such  a  scale?  The  public  dispute  over  monetary  policy  was -II-
important because it signalled the  end of attempts  to stabilise  the  dollar, 
but  it is  difficult  to  believe  the  direct  effect  on  fundamentals  of  the 
implied  change  in  monetary  policies  could  of  themselves  justify  such  an 
enormous  re-evaluation of  economic  prospects.6  Other  events  both  economic 
- such  as  continuing poor American  trade  figures  - and political - such  as 
increasing  tension  in  the  Gulf  - may  also  have  increased  pessimism  and 
uncertainty  in  the  financial  markets.  However,  many  of  these  events  were 
specific  to  the  United  States  and  if  the  crash  were  due  to  a  downward 
revision of profit expectations  one  is  led to  ask  why  the  stock markets  of 
other  countries  were  affected  to  a  similar  or  greater  degree.  Contrarily 
if  the  crash  were  primarily  due  to  an  upward  revision  in  interest  rate 
expectations  this  should have been reflected in lower bond prices,  but this 
was  not  generally  the  case.  An  increase  in  the  risk  premium  on  equity 
earnings  is  a  possibility,  and  the  price  of  Chicago  put  options  in  the 
Standard  and  Poor  index  - which  provides  an  indication  of  the  market's 
assessment  of  risk  - had  been  moving  upwards  immediately  prior  to  the 
crash.7  However,the  required increase  in the risk premium  is enormous  and 
again it is not clear why  all of the world's  stock markets  should have  been 
affected equally. 
Furthermore,  timing  is  a  problem.  Although  there  had  been  some 
downward  drift  in  American  share  prices  in  the  week  ending  16th  October, 
there was  no  major  economic  "news"  occurring over  the  weekend prior to  19th 
October.  One  would have  expected instead  a  gradual drift  downwards  of  the 
market as  successive bits of new  information were  gradually discounted  into 
the market price. 
This  is  supported  by  evidence  from  a  survey  of  nearly  a  thousand 
individual  and  institutional investors  in the  United  States  carried out  in 
the  wake  of  the  crash  by  Robert  Shiller,  8  which  indicates  that  no  news -12-
story  or  rumor  appearing  on  or  immediately  before  19th  October  was 
responsible  for  behaviour  that  day.  Instead  market  psychology  seems  to 
have  played  a  crucial  role  with  most  investors  believing  the  market  was 
overpriced  prior  to  the  crash,  but  still continuing  to  buy  stocks  in  the 
belief  they  could  out  guess  the  market  in  predicting  when  the  collapse 
would  come. 
Finally,  as  Figure  1  shows,  equity  prices  in  the  United  States,  Japan 
and  the United Kingdom,  at least,  had been growing especially rapidly since 
about  the middle  of 1986,  and far outstripping bond prices.  In Germany  and 
France  where  the  stock market  had  been  fairly  stagnant  since  the  start of 
1987,  one  would  probably  have  expected  to  see  significant  falls  as  growth 
turned out  lower  than was  generally expected.  To  explain  the  stock market 
crash  in  terms  of  fundamentals  alone  one  needs  not  only  to  identify  the 
reasons  for  the  crash  itself,  but  also  explain  why  the  market  had  been  so 
buoyant  in the preceeding months  and how  an  increasingly optimistic outlook 
on  company  profitability  could  evaporate  so  quickly,  or  how  decreasing 
uncertainty  and  a  falling  risk  premium  on  equity  earnings  could  suddenly 
reverse.  Consequently  it  seems  inconceivable  that  the  movements  of  the 
world  stock  markets  in  the  last year  or  two  can  be  explained  entirely by 
movements  in  fundamentals.  In  the  light  of  Shiller's  survey  evidence  a 
better explanation is simply that the  crash was  the bursting of a  "bubble". 
Does  this  imply  that  markets  are  necessarily  inefficient9  or 
irrational?  The  answer  is  no.  For  instance  between  the beginning of  1987 
and  19th  October  the  rate  of  interest  on  Treasury  bonds  averaged  6  per 
cent.  Over  the  same  period  the  dividend yield  on  Standard  and  Poor  index 
stocks  averaged  just under  3  per  cent,  while  the  index  itself rose  at  an 
annualised  rate  of nearly  50  per  cent,  implying  an  excess  total  return  on 
equities  of  47  per  cent  per  annum.  However,  if market  operators  believe I) 
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there  is  a  possibility  that  the  market  may  crash  the  ex  ante  expected 
return will be  much  less.  Even if they are completely indifferent to risk, 
they  may  still be willing to hold Treasury bonds  even  though  in the  run-up 
of  the market before  the bubble bursts  the  total return  on  equities vastly 
exceeds  that on Treasury bonds.  For  instance  suppose  we  date  the start of 
the  bubble  as  the  beginning  of  1987  and  assume  that  the  rate  of  capital 
gains,  conditional  on  the  bubble  continuing,  was  correctly  foreseen.  Let 
us  also  assume  that  investors  believed  that  in  the  event  of  the  bubble 
bursting  it would  revert  to  its  end-1986  level.  Then  one  only  needs  a 
probability  of  the  market  collapsing  within  a  month  of  30  per  cent  to 
rationalise  the  sort  of  figures  just  discussed  (the  figure  would  be  even 
lower  if risk were  allowed  for).10  Given  the  amount  of discussion  in  the 
financial  press  in  1987  on  how  long  the  bull  market  could  go  on,  such  a 
number  does  not  seem at all implausible. 
This  view of the  crash does  not rule out  an  important  trigger role  for 
economic  (and political) variables,  for  there is no  reason why  the  collapse 
of  the  bubble  need  be  a  purely  exogenous  event.  In  general  such  a 
"rational bubble"  i.e.  one  in which  large  excess  returns  are  offset by  the 
possibility of  a  very  large  loss,  can  be  conditioned  on  a  whole  range  of 
factors,  including  those  which  also  affect  the  fundamental  value  of  the 
asset.ll  In  such  a  case  the  market  can  therefore  give  the  appearance  of 
overreacting  to  bits  of  news  that  imply  only  a  small  change  in 
fundamentals.  Thus  even  though  the  public  disagreement  between  the 
American  administration  and  the  Bundesbank  cannot  possibly  justify  a 
reassessment of underlying fundamentals  of  25  per cent or more,  it may  well 
have  played  an  important  role,  along  with  other  factors  such  as  the 
American trade deficit,  in triggering the crash. -14-
It  should,  however,  be  acknowledged  that  there  are  some  apparent 
inconsistencies  in  the  view  that  the  crash  was  simply  the  ending  of  a 
rational  speculative  bubble.  Firstly  the  fact  that  the  French  and  German 
stock markets  suffered more  than the  United  States,  the  market  that  seemed 
most  obviously  overvalued,  is  problematic.  Even  given  the  fact  that  one 
would probably have  expected to  see  French and  German equity prices falling 
during  the  first  nine  months  of  1987  in  response  to  slower  than  expected 
growth  in those  economies,  it seems  difficult  to  sustain the  argument  that 
by  the  end  of  September  they  were  just  as  overvalued,  relative  to 
fundamentals,  as  the  American  market.  Thus  it  seems  that  one  probably 
needs  to  introduce  "contagion"  stories12  to  explain  the  close  linkages 
between  different  financial  centres  as  well  as  the  speed  of  the  fall. 
However  the  precise  nature  of  the  transmission  mechanism  between  markets, 
and the  role of programmed selling arrangements  which led to  many  financial 
institutions simultaneously placing large block sell orders,  while  no  doubt 
important  from  a  regulatory  viewpoint,  is  of  secondary  interest  in 
establishing  the  ultimate  causes  of  the  crash.  For  it  is  difficult  to 
believe  that  these  were  the  prime movers  behind events,  and  that  the  crash 
was  simply an aberration on  the part of operators  in financial markets.  If 
that  were  the  case  one  would  have  expected  the  market  to  have  quickly 
recovered  as  speculators  moved  in  to  pick  up  stocks  at  bargain  prices. 
Although  there  was  some  evidence  of this  in the  weeks  following  the  crash, 
it has  not  occurred  on  anything  like  the  scale  one  would  have  expected  if 
equities  were  subsequently  priced  substantially  below  their  fundamental 
value. 
A  second  difficulty  is  that  the  growing  likelihood  of  a  very  large 
capital  loss  in  the  run-up  to  the  crash  should  have  manifested  itself in 
the  price of put  options.  Except  immediately before  19th October  this  did -15-
not  seem  to  be  the  case.  The  most  likely  rationalisation  here  is  that 
investors  worried  about  the  risk of  a  crash  turned  to  portfolio  insurance 
schemes  rather than the  option market as  a  way of insuring themselves.  The 
problem,  of  course,  with  this  strategy  is  that while  this  is  rational  for 
an  individual,  portfolio  insurance  schemes  cannot work  for  the  market  as  a 
whole  because  the  risk  is  non-diversifiable.  It  seems  that  otherwise 
rational  market  investors  may  have  made  a  fallacy-of-composition  error  in 
assuming  this  strategy  would  still  work  even  if  pursued  by  other 
investors. 
1.3  THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  CRASH 
The  two  direct  channels  through  which  a  revaluation  of  wealth  affects 
the  economy  are  via  consumption  and  investment  (and  indirectly  as  these 
same  mechanisms  affect  export  demand) .  The  first  of  these,  through  the 
so-called wealth effect,  received most  attention in the  immediate  aftermath 
of the crash.  If households  accumulate wealth to  finance  their retirement, 
to bequeath  to  their children,  or  simply  for  a  rainy  day,  then  a  reduction 
in  wealth  will  lead  them  to  increase  savings  in  order  to  rebuild  their 
stock  of  assets.  Under  the  pure  life-cycle  permanent-income  view  of 
consumption  the  fall  in  expenditure  should  be  simply  the  fall  in  wealth 
times  the  real  (long)  rate  of  interest,  i.e.  the  amount  by  which  the 
indefinitely sustainable level of consumption has  fallen.  With  a  global  11 
trillion  dollar  fall  in  stock  market  wealth,  this  implies  a  fall  in 
consumers  expenditure  of  30-45  billion  dollars  worldwide.  In  the  United 
States  and  Japan,  the  same  calculus  implies  a  direct  (i.e.  ignoring 
multiplier  effects)  fall  in  consumers'  expenditure  of  around  a-!  per  cent 
of GNP.  In the United Kingdom  the  figure  is rather  larger at  ~-1 per cent 
of  GNP,  while  in  France,  Germany  and  Italy with  their  relatively  smaller 
stock  markets  it is  a  meagre  A-a  per  cent  of  GNP.  These  figures  could -16-
understate  the  size  of  the  wealth  effect  in  so  far  as  consumers  have  a 
shorter  time  horizon  than  envisaged  in  the  basic  life-cycle  permanent 
income  consumption model  or suffer liquidity or capital market constraints. 
On  the  other  hand  only  in  the  United  States  are  there  extensive  direct 
individual  equity  holdings.  In  the  other  countries  much  of  the  equity 
capital  is held  indirectly via pension  funds  and  the  like.  This  is  likely 
to attenuate  the  size of the effects on  consumption and/or produce  a  rather 
delayed  response  in  these  countries.  So  overall  the  numbers  seem  of  the 
right  order  of  magnitude.  These  effects,  which  after  allowing  for 
multiplier  effects  are  of  the  same  order  as  those  put  forward  by  the  IMF 
and  the  OECD  in  their  assessments  of  the  quantitative  significance  of  the 
crash,  although  not  completely  insignificant,  are  generally  rather  small 
beer. 
It might be  thought  that if the diagnosis  of the  crash as  the  ending of 
a  speculative bubble  is correct,  then realising the capital gain might  only 
be  temporary,  consumers  would  not have  increased  their  spending before  the 
crash,  nor  reduced  it afterwards.  This  argument  is  not  strictly correct 
because  individual  equity  holders  always  had  the  option  of  switching  to 
less risky assets prior to  the  crash and  so  ensuring the capital gains  they 
had  experienced  previously  were  not  reversed.  Put  differently  the 
continued  growth  in  equity  prices  during  the  first  nine  months  of .1987 
represented  a  succession  of  pieces  of  good  news  with  the  possibility  of 
future  bad  news  (a  crash)  being  offset  by  the  possibility  of  continued 
pieces  of good  news  (further prices  rises).  However,  it is  quite possible 
that  some  of  those  consumers  who  hold  equities  are  not  as  calculating  as 
this,  in  which  case  the  argument  may  have  some  force,  attenuating  the 
wealth effects further. -17-
It is becoming  increasingly clear  through  1988  that  indeed  consumption 
does  not  seem  to have  faltered in the United States  or elsewhere.  One  way 
to  assess  the  size of the  wealth effect on  consumption would be  to  compare 
the  outturn,  with  the  levels  of  consumption  predicted  by  an  econometric 
model  of the  consumption function.  Here,  however,  we  rely on  a  simpler  and 
more  straightforward approach.  The  life-cycle permanent  income  consumption 
model  predicts  that households  smooth  consumption  in  the  face  of  temporary 
income  fluctuations,  etc.  More  particularly,  if  households  are 
forward-looking  in  forming  their  expectations  of  future  income  the  best 
predictor  of  future  consumption  will  be,  roughly  speaking,  today's 
consumption,13  and changes  in consumption will solely be  the result of news 
about  income  prospects,  wealth,  etc.  Thus  under  the  life-cycle  permanent 
income  model,  one  would  have  expected  to  see  a  fall  in  the  growth  rate  of 
consumption in the period after the  crash and,  for  those countries  like  the 
United  States  who  experienced  a  bull  market,  above  average  growth  in  the 
first nine months  of 1987. 
Figure  2  presents  a  plot of  recent  data  on  the  monthly  growth  rate  of 
consumption  in  the  United  States  (where  the  largest  wealth  effects  are 
likely to be  found).  To  facilitate interpretation a  6-month moving  average 
is  also  plotted.  As  can  be  seen  there  is  a  period  of  slightly  above 
average  growth  during  the  first  part  of  1987,  and  a  negative  spike  just 
after  the  crash,  but  the  size  of  the  adjustments  to  the  consumption  path 
are  if anything  smaller  than  suggested  above,  indicating  that  if anything 
the  illustrative calculations  overstate  the  quantitative  importance  of  the 
wealth effect. 
The  likely  impact  on  investment by  contrast  does  depend heavily  on  the 
reason for  the fall in the  stock market.  If the fall was  due  to  an adverse 
movement  in  fundamentals  - a  reduction  in  the  profitability of  investment -18-
or an  increase  in expected real interest rates  - then a  sympathetic fall  in 
investment  can  be  expected.  However,  empirical  implementation  of  the  "Q" 
model  of  investment  which  links  capital  formation  directly  to  the  real 
stock  price  have  generally  not  been  especially  successful,  there  being 
usually an  important additional explanatory role for output.  Although this 
can be  rationalised by allowing for  imperfect competition in goods  markets, 
it  is  fair  to  say  that  economists'  understanding  of  the  forces  driving 
investment  is  still at  a  fairly  rudimentary  level  and  one  must  rely  on  a 
more  empiricist  approach.  Studies  in this  tradition14 generally  introduce 
demand  and  profitability/cost  of  capital  variables  into  investment 
functions  in  a  more  or  less  ad  hoc  fashion  which  makes  them  rather 
unsuitable  for  quantifying the effects of the  crash on  investment. 
However,  we  have  argued  that  the  crash  is  best  understood  as  the 
collapse  of  a  bubble.  If this  diagnosis  is  correct  then  the  link between 
the  stock  price  and  investment  that  underlies  the  "Q"  model  is  severed, 
because  the  role  of  the  stock price  in  the  theory  is  simply  to  proxy  the 
unobservable  present  discounted  value  of  future  (net)  profits.  If  the 
stock  price  no  longer  accurately  reflects  fundamentals,  then it no  longer 
reflects  the  marginal  efficiency  of  investment  either  .15  Indeed,  one  is 
tempted  to  suggest  that  if the  underlying  fundamentals  have  not  changed, 
there  is  no  reason  why  investment  should  be  adversely  affected  at  all. 
Things  are not quite  so  simple because  the fall  in the stock market has,  of 
course,  raised  the  cost  of  equity  finance,  relative  to  pre-crash  levels. 
Unfortunately,  our  understanding  of  the  determinants  of  the  financial 
structure  of  firms  is  even  less  good  than  our  understanding  of  investment 
behaviour!  If  equity  capital  is  the  marginal  source  of  finance  for 
investment  some  adverse effect might be  anticipated.  On  the other hand,  if 
debt  finance  is  the  marginal  source  of  finance,  as  some  have  suggested, -19-
then  there  should  be  no  effect  (assuming  the  required  return  on  debt 
finance  remains  unchanged  of  course).l6  It  is  difficult  to  know, 
therefore,  how  big  such  a  cost-of-capital effect might  be,  but  in view  of 
the difficulty in isolating any  link from  the cost of capital  to  investment 
empirically,  it seems  likely to be very small. 
The  greatest danger  as  far as  investment is concerned is that  increased 
uncertainty  about  economic  developments  - and  particularly  about  policy 
reactions  - will  lead  to  managers  postponing  or  even  cancelling  investment 
projects  that  they  would  otherwise  have  undertaken.  In  the  absence  of 
countervailing  policy  action,  such  a  fall  in  investment  due  to  increased 
uncertainty  could  well  become  a  self-fulfilling  prophecy,  with  the 
resulting  reduction  in  demand  leading  to  a  recession,  and  reduced 
profitability justifying ex  post  the  original  postponement  or  cancellation 
of the  investment.  Thus  while  the direct effect of the  crash on  investment 
through  the  cost  of  capital  is  likely  to  have  been  modest,  there  was  a 
danger  that  a  more  pessimistic  and  bearish  outlook  amongst  managers  could 
have  led to  a  collapse  in investment. 
Fortunately,  such  a  collapse  does  not  seem  to have materialised so  far. 
Rather  than  focussing  on  the  latest  data  on  investment  expenditures  as  we 
did with consumption,  given the  lags between  the  decision to  invest and  the 
actual  realisation  of  these  plans,  it is  more  informative  to  look  at  the 
latest survey evidence  on businessman's  intentions.  Unfortunately,  results 
of the March/April  survey of investment  intentions  in the  Community  are not 
available  at  the  time  of  writing,  but  a  good  guide  in  its  absence  is 
provided by  the  industrial confidence  indicator constructed by  the  European 
Commission  from  monthly  industrial trends  surveys.  As  Table  4  makes  clear, 
this does  not  seem  to have been significantly dented by  the  crash. -20-
However,  there  is  st'ill  considerable  uncertainty  about  economic 
developments  in the  medium-term,  and  the  robustness  of the world economy  in 
the  wake  of  the  crash has  led  to  a  worrying  degree  of  complacency  amongst 
the  world's  leaders.  As  we  discuss  below,  there  is  still the  possibility 
of  a  major  recession,  especially in Europe,  around  the  corner  and  fears  of 
this  may  yet  provoke  a  collapse  in  investment,  despite  the  prospects 
afforded by  the  completion of the  internal market  in 1992.  Such  a  collapse 
is  much  less  likely  if  firms  can  be  confident  that  the  demand  for  their 
products  will  be  sustained.  An  investment  collapse  is  therefore  less 
probable  if governments  commit  themselves  to  maintaining  (nominal)  demand 
in the  face  of adverse  shocks. 
1.4 A  COMPARISON  WITH  THE  THIRTIES 
If  the  direct  effects  of  a  stock  market  crash  are  so  modest,  one  is 
naturally  led  to  ask:  Why  did  the  stock  market  crash  of  1929  apparently 
have  such  a  disastrous  impact  on  the United States  and world economies?  An 
in-depth  study  of  the  Great  Depression  would  be  inappropriate  here. 
However,  a  crucial  ingredient  was  the  extent  to  which  economic  policies 
moved  in  a  perverse  direction.  Thus  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the 
crash of 1929  the  Federal Reserve,  rather  than  responding  to  the  increased 
demand  for  liquidity,  instead  tightened  monetary  policy  resulting  in  a 
massive  contraction  in  the  money  supply  and  a  wave  of  bankruptcies .17 
Fortunately  the  lessons  of this experience  seemed  to  have  been  learned and 
all  central  banks  responded  to  the  crash  of  1987  by  lowering  interest 
rates,  even in Germany  where  fears  of excessive money  growth were  greatest. 
The  possible  collapse  of  any  major  financial  institution  and  the  sparking 
off of a  run on  the banks  seems  to have been successfully avoided.l8 (4) 
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Moreover,  not  only monetary,  but  fiscal  and  trade  policies  moved  in  a 
perverse  direction during  the  early thirties.  There  was  a  widespread  move 
towards  balanced budgets  which  augmented  the  deflationary  impulses  set  in 
train by  the monetary contraction.  Finally in response  to  the  Hawley-Smoot 
tariff in the United States  and  growing unemployment  there was  a  widespread 
adoption  of  protectionist  measures.  While  such  beggar-my-neighbour 
policies  might  prevent  unemployment  rising  in  a  single  country,  they  are 
clearly  self-defeating if pursued by  all,  and  the  result  was  a  fall  of  30 
per cent in world trade between  1929  and  1932.  While  the monetary mistakes 
of  the  Thirties  have  been  avoided,  the  unwitting  adoption  of  similarly 
perverse  fiscal  and  trade  policies  represents  the  greatest  threat  to  the 
world and European  economies  in  the next few years. -22-
2.  ADJUSTMENT  IN  THE  MEDIUM  TERM:  WHERE  DO  WE  WANT  TO  GET  TO? 
2.1  FISCAL  POLICY 
We  next  consider  what  direction  economic  particularly  fiscal 
policies  - need  to  move  in  the  medium  term.  As  noted  above,  the  United 
States  general  government  deficit  is  now  not  very  different  from  the  OECD 
average.  Further  the  primary  balance  i.e.  excluding  net  debt  service,  is 
expected to be  roughly  zero  for  the next  two  years  (see e.g.  OECD,  Economic 
Outlook,  December  1987).  As  a  consequence  the  growth  of  the  net 
debt-income  ratio  should  slacken  significantly.  Indeed,  so  long  as  the 
current  gap  of  around  2  per  cent  between  the  real  interest  rate  and  the 
rate  of  growth  of  United  States  output  does  not  widen  the  current  net 
debt-income  ratio  of  30  per  cent  could  be  sustained  indefinitely  with  a 
further fall  in the  general  government  deficit of only  ~per cent of GNP.19 
Does  this  stabilisation of  the  United  States  debt-income  ratio  imply  that 
no  further  fiscal  adjustment  on  the part of  the  United  States  is  required? 
The  answer  is  "No"  on  two  counts. 
First,  so  long as  the private savings  rate  remains  so  low  in the United 
States  a  satisfactory rate  of  growth  and  capital  accumulation  can  only  be 
sustained by  a  continuing  inflow  of  funds  from  abroad,  and  the  associated 
accumulation of foreign debt.  This  could rise to  as  much  as  35  per  cent of 
United States  GNP  by  1995.20  This  seems  unlikely  to  be  a  viable  option as 
the  growing  risk  of  de  facto  debt  repudiation  through  exchange  rate 
depreciation will  lead foreign  investors  to  require  a  greater risk premium 
on  dollar-denominated  debt,  or  else  that  the  United  States  authorities 
issue  increasing quantities  of debt  denominated  in other  currencies.  Even 
if this course  of action were  economically feasible it would not  seem  to be 
possible  in domestic political terms  for  the United States  to be  so  heavily 
dependent  on foreign  investors. -23-
Second,  even  if  this  scenario  were  achievable  it  does  not  seem 
particularly  desirable  on  normative  grounds  that  the  most  capital-rich 
country  in the  world  should be  importing yet more  capital  from  the  rest of 
the world.  Rather capital should flow  from  the  industrialised countries  to 
the  developing  countries  where  the  rewards  to  investment  ought  to  be 
greatest.  Of  course,  political  instability,  economic  mismanagement,  and 
similar  considerations  often  reduce  the  attractiveness  of  foreign 
investment  in many  developing countries.  Further,  at  the  present  time  the 
juxtaposition of a  heavy existing debt burden,  continued high real  interest 
rates  and  generally  sluggish  growth  in  the  demand  for  their  exports  make 
private  investment  in  the  developing  countries  especially  unattractive. 
Nevertheless,  the  conclusion  still  stands  that  in  the  medium  term  a 
reduction in the absorption of savings  by  the United States  and  an  increase 
in the  flow  of capital  to  developing  countries  is  desirable.  Consequently 
one  would  like  to  see  the  industrialised  countries  as  a  whole  running  a 
current  account  surplus  in  order  to  finance  these  capital  flows.  "  It 
should,  of course,  be  emphasised that this  pattern of current  accounts  and 
capital  flows  is  merely  an  equilibrium  characteristic  and  does  not  of 
itself justify measures  to  contract activity in  the  developed  countries  in 
order  to  improve  (or  maintain)  their  current  accounts  - that  would  reduce 
the  demand  for  the  produce  of the  developing  countries  and just exacerbate 
matters. 
It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  in  the  medium  term  a  reduction  in  the 
United  States  budget  deficit  is  both  desirable  and  necessary.  One  is 
naturally  led  to  ask what  other  changes  will be  necessary?  In particular 
will  a  fiscal  contraction in the United States also  eliminate,  or at least 
very  significantly  reduce,  the  United  States  current  account  deficit? 
Given  the  coincidence  of  the  rise  in both  the  budget  and  current  account -24-
deficits  and  their  approximately  similar  magnitudes  it is  tempting  to  say 
that the elimination of the budget deficit would by itself be  sufficient to 
restore current account  equilibrium.  This  is  a  rather  "New  Cambridge"  view 
that  might  have  some  truth  for  a  small,  very  open,  internationally highly 
integrated economy  such  as  Luxembourg.  It is most  definitely incorrect for 
a  country  such  as  the  United  States.  For,  as  emphasised  in  the  CEPS 
Macroeconomic  Policy  Group's  latest  report, 21  the  trade  linkages  between 
the United States  and  the  other industrialised countries,  including Europe, 
are still fairly small with  the major  international linkages  corning  through 
the  financial  markets.  Thus  the  share  of  imports  in United  States  output 
is  still,  despite  the  recent  surge,  only  around  10  per  cent.  Empirical 
import  equations  usually  produce  marginal  propensities  to  import  of  around 
1~.  Thus  the  direct effect of a  cut  in government  spending  or  an  increase 
in  taxes  could  be  expected  to  impinge  primarily  on  domestically  produced 
rather  than  foreign  goods.  A  cut  of  100  billion  dollars  in  the  budget 
deficit  might  therefore  lead  to  an  initial  improvement  of  the  current 
account  of  a  mere  15-20  billion  dollars  (after  allowing  for  multiplier 
effects).  This  could understate  the  impact  of  a  fiscal  contraction on  the 
United  States  trade balance  to  the  extent  that output  in  the  United  States 
is  predominantly  supply  rather  than  demand-determined.  In  that  case  the 
resources  released  by  the  fall  in  domestic  expenditures  would  flow  into 
exports  or  import-substitution.  However,  the  effect  is  likely  to  be 
considerably less  than one  for  one  even near full  employment. 
Simulations  with  rnacroeconornetric  models  support  this  figuring.  A 
recent  Brookings  study22  reported  the  results  of  a  number  of  standard 
simulations  on  the  leading econometric models  of the  international economy. 
These  suggest  that  at  the  current  time  a  100  billion  dollar  fiscal 
contraction in the United States would  produce  a  fall  in  the  trade  deficit -25-
of  around  20  billion  dollars  in  the  second  year  (the  OECD' s  model  is 
something of an outlier in suggesting a  figure  nearer  30 billion dollars). 
A  corollary  of this  is  that  increased  growth  in  Europe  (or  elsewhere) 
can  do  very  little  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  United  States  current 
account deficit,  for  the  required  increase  in demand  would be  of  the  order 
of a  trillion dollars!  While  there may  be underutilisation of resources  in 
Europe  today,  especially  labour,  there  is  no  possibility  of 
non-inflationary growth  on this scale. 
The  great paradox of the present world economic  situation is  that while 
public  debate  focusses  on  the  need  for  the  Japanese  and  Europeans  -
especially  Germany  - to  undertake  expansionary  fiscal  action  to  stimulate 
their economies,  this will  do  very little to solve  the  global  imbalances  in 
trade.  Yet  at the  same  time,  as  laid out  in the  Commission's  own  strategy 
for  growth,  European  self-interest  argues  for  exactly  this  sort  of 
supply-friendly fiscal action.  Given  the  inability of fiscal  changes  alone 
to  solve  the  problem  it  is  therefore  clear  that  other  adjustments  and 
mechanisms 
required. 
in  particular  through  the  real  exchange  rate  - will  be 
2.2  HAS  THE  DOLLAR  FALLEN  ENOUGH? 
As  Figure  3  shows,  the dollar real  exchange  rate  is  now  nearly back  to 
1979  levels,  a  period  when  the  United  States  current  account  was 
approximately  in  balance.  An  obvious  question  is  whether  the  real 
depreciation  that  has  occurred  since  the  dollar  peaked  in  1986  will,  if 
maintained,  be  sufficient to restore  a  sustainable current account position 
in due  course.  By  sustainable we  mean  a  position in which  the net  foreign 
debt-national  income  ratio  is  stabilised.  There  are  a  number  of  reasons 
for  thinking that some  further real depreciation may be  required. -26-
First,  output  growth  in  the  United  States  since  1979  has  averaged  2.6 
per cent,  faster  than  the  2.3 per cent achieved in the rest of the  OECD  and 
much  faster  than  the  meagre  1.7  per  cent  achieved  in  the  Community.  This 
differential  growth  means  that  the  domestic  market  has  grown  faster  than 
export  markets  which  would naturally tend  to  worsen  the  current  account  at 
a  given  real  exchange  rate.  However,  given  the  relatively  low  marginal 
propensities  of  the  United  States  to  import  from  the  rest of  the  OECD  and 
vice  versa,  the  effect  on  the  current  account  is  rather  small  - around  10 
billion dollars  or  a  l  per cent of GNP. 
Second,  since  the  beginning  of  the  decade  the  net  foreign  asset 
position of the United States has  worsened by more  than  ~  trillion dollars. 
Meeting  the  interest  payments  on  this  debt  will  require  running  a  trade 
surplus.  However,  the  effect  is  not  that  large  because  all  that  is 
required  to  stabilise  the  foreign  debt-national  income  ratio  is  that  the 
United States run  a  trade  surplus sufficient to meet  real,  growth-corrected 
interest  payments.  With  a  real  interest  rate  of,  say,  4  per  cent  and  a 
growth  rate  of  2  per  cent  the  required  improvement  in  the  trade  balance 
(relative  to  1979)  is  only  10  billion  dollars  or  something  like  a  a per 
cent  of  GNP.  Even  if  the  aim  was  to  pay  off  the  accumulated  debt,  the 
required  improvement  in the  trade  account  need  not be  much  larger provided 
the  adjustment  took place within a  reasonably  long  time period. 
A  more  serious  issue  relates  to  the  effect  of  movements  in  the  real 
exchange  rate on  trade volumes.  The  J-curve  phenomenon whereby  an exchange 
depreciation  produces  an  initial  deterioration  in  the  trade  account  as 
relative prices move  in advance  of the  response  of trade volumes  to  changes 
in  relative  prices  has  long  been  a  bugbear  of  forecasters  and  policy 
makers,  and  it  may  well  be  that  some  of  the  persistence  of  the  United 
States  current  account  deficit  in  the  -face  of  the  30  per  cent  real -27-
depreciation  (measured  in terms  of relative unit  labour  costs)  of  the  last 
two  years  simply reflects  the  slow working  out of these  lags.  (The  recent, 
better  than  expected,  United  States  trade  figures  we·re  hopeful  in  this 
regard,  but it is easy  to  read  too  much  into  the  figures  for  a  particular 
month.)  However,  it is  likely  that  the  stubborness  of  the  trade  deficit 
may  reflect  something  more  fundamental,  namely  "hysteresis"  - or  state 
dependence  - in traded goods  markets. 
Hysteresis  could  arise  in  trade  performance  for  a  number  of  reasons. 
First,  consumers  having  sampled  a  particular product  are  likely  to  develop 
loyalty  to  that  brand,  especially  if  the  quality  of  competing  brands  is 
unknown  (this  sort  of  process  seems  to  apply  particularly  well  to 
automobiles).  Thus  it might  take  a  very  large  movement  in relative prices 
to  encourage  the  consumer  to  switch  from  one  (a  domestically  produced) 
brand to another  (a foreign one)  in the first place,  but  a  simple  return of 
relative  prices  to  the  status  quo  ante  may  not  be  sufficient  to  force  the 
consumer  to return to  the original brand.  Instead a  period of considerable 
underpricing of the original brand may  be  required.  A  similar argument  can 
be  developed  when  consumers  experience  considerable  costs  in  switching 
between suppliers  - again there may  be  a  "locking-in" effect (this would be 
relevant to,  say,  computers). 
However,  the  channel  that  has  gained  most  attention  emanates  from  the 
supply  rather  than  demand  side  of  the  market. 23  There  are  usually  very 
substantial  fixed  costs  in  entering  a  market  in  the  form  of  setting  up 
distribution networks,  advertising  campaigns  to  announce  the  product,  etc. 
A  firm will only enter  a  market  and  incur  these  costs  if the  present value 
of  the  expected  future  profits  covers  these  fixed  costs.  However,  once 
these  costs have  been  incurred a  firm will stay in the market  provided  the 
present  value  of  the  expected  future  profits  is  positive,  not  that  they -28-
exceed  the  fixed  costs. 24  Thus  it  may  take  a  large  deterioration  in 
profitability  to  persuade  a  company  to  quit  a  market,  but  it will  not  be 
sufficient  for  profitability  merely  to  be  restored  for  the  company  to 
re-enter  there  will  actually  have  to  have  been  a  period  when 
profitability is extremely high to justify incurring the entry costs. 
The  moral  is  that  small  movements  in  real  exchange  rates  may  have 
relatively  minor  effects  on  the  structure  of  trade,  but  large,  sustained 
although  nevertheless  temporary,  movements  can  have  major  and  relatively 
permanent  effects.  Thus  in the  last decade  European  and  (especially)  Far 
Eastern  producers  have,  in  the  face  of  the  sustained  overvaluation  of  the 
dollar,  been  keen  to  enter  the  United  States  domestic  market,  while 
American producers have  similarly been willing to undertake  the  substantial 
costs  of  relocating  production  abroad  to  take  advantage  of  the  large  gap 
that  was  opened  up  in  relative  unit  labour  costs.  The  unwinding  of  the 
overvaluation  will  not  necessarily  be  sufficient  to  reverse  these 
structural  changes,  and  a  corresponding period of  sustained undervaluation 
of the dollar may  be  required. 
It  might  be  thought  that,  although  fixed  costs  of  entry  may  be 
significant,  they cannot be  that large.  There  is,  however,  another  and yet 
more  subtle  channel  through  which  hysteresis  effects  might  arise.25  This 
stems  from  the  uncertainty  engendered  by  volatility  of  the  exchange  rate 
which  may  encourage  firms  to  take  a  wait-and-see  attitude.  The  point  is 
that  even  if it is  currently unprofitable  to  produce  in  a  market  if there 
is  a  possibility  that  it  may  become  profitable  in  the  future  it  may  be 
worth  staying  in.  The  choice  is  not  merely  between  being  in  a  market  or 
out  of it but  also  between  entering  (exiting)  today  rather  than  entering 
(exiting)  tomorrow.  Essentially  a  firm  that  is not  now  producing  owns  an 
option  for  entering  in  the  future  and  a  firm  that  is  producing  owns  an (5) 
-29-
option  for exiting.  The  implicit cost of exercising these  options  adds  an 
additional  invisible cost to  the visible fixed costs  of entry. 
Empirical  support  for  the  thesis  of  hysteresis  comes  from  the  recent 
behaviour  of  United  States  import  prices.  As  Figure  3  demonstrates, 
exporters  to  the  United  States  have  preferred  to  fix  their  dollar  price, 
cut  profit  margins  and  maintain  volumes  in  the  face  of  the  dollar 
depreciation.  As  a  consequence  trade volumes  and  the  current  account  have 
been much  slower  to  respond  to  the  fall  in the  dollar  than might have  been 
expected,  and  consquently  a  further  fall  in  the  real  value  of  the  dollar 
may  well  be  required. 26  How  big  that  further  fall  needs  to  be  is 
unfortunately  impossible  to  quantify  since  past  experience  as  embodied  in 
econometric  trade  equations  is  no  longer  a  good  guide  to  the  future  but 
numbers  like 10-20 per cent  seem  to be  in the  right ball park. 
2.3  THE  ROLE  OF  THE  NICs 
So  far  the  discussion  has  concentrated  on  the  United  States  on  one 
hand,  and  Europe  and  Japan  on  the  other.  Yet  this  ignores  other  major 
players  in  the  world  economy.  As ide  from  the  developing  countries,  who 
ought  to  be  running  current  account  deficits  but  are  not  currently  in  a 
position to,  the  Newly  Industrialised Countries also have  a  role  to play in 
picking  up  some  of  the  present  American  trade  deficit.  In  1987  the  Asian 
NICs  ran  a  collective  surplus  of  30  billion dollars  (more  than 10  per  cent 
of  their  GNP).  As  Table  5  shows  most  of  this  was  concentrated  in Taiwan. 
Korea  has  also  been  running  a  significant  surplus,  but  this  is  a 
comparatively  recent  phenonenon,  and  indeed  Korea  suffered  from  external 
debt  problems  during  the  early  eighties. 
contrast,  more  persistent. 
The  Taiwanese  surplus  is,  by -30-
Overall  the  Asian  NICs  have  exhibited  a  meteoric  increase  in  their 
share  of the  world manufactured trade  from  a  little over  4  per cent  in 1975 
to  around  10  per  cent  in  1987  - nearly  as  high  as  Japan's  share.  Much  of 
this  growth  has  been  directed  at  the  American  market  especially  in  the 
eighties  as  producers  benefitted  from  the  overvaluation  of  the  dollar. 
Overall  the  United  States  has  experienced  an  adverse  shift  of  60  billion 
dollars  in trade  in manufactures  with  these countries  since  1980. 
There  is  no  good  reason  for  Taiwan  or  any  other  of  these  countries  to 
be  capital  exporters,  especially  since  their  past  capital  growth  has  been 
domestically  financed  and  so  trade  surpluses  are  not  necessary  to  finance 
interest  payments  on  foreign  debt.  Rather  these  countries  will  need  to 
increase  domestic  absorption.  Both  Taiwan  and  Korea  have  started removing 
restrictions on  imports.  However  import  growth alone will be  insufficient, 
and  real  exchange  rate  adjustment  is  also  required.  As  Table  6 
demonstrates,  however,  there  has  been  very  little  sign  of  any  real 
appreciation of the  Taiwanese  dollar  since  1985  and  in nominal  terms  these 
currencies  have  only  risen  15  per  cent  against  the  dollar  since  the  start 
of  1986  as  opposed  to  the  35  per cent appreciation experienced by  the  rest 
of the  OECD. 
An  obvious  question  in  the  light  of  this  is  whether  further  real 
depreciation  of  the  dollar  against  the  European  currencies  is  called  for, 
or  whether  an  appreciation  of  the  Yen  and  the  NICs  alone  will  be 
sufficient.  The  answer  would  seem  to be  that  the  European  currencies  need 
to  appreciate  against  the  dollar  but  depreciate  against  the  Far  Eastern 
currencies.  As  already  noted  the  Far  East  producers  in  particular  took 
advantage  of  the  dollar  overvaluation,  resulting  in a  semi-permanent  shift 
in the  structure of trade between  the  two  blocs.  However  increased  growth 
in the  Far  East bloc  and/or  a  real appreciation of their currencies  is  not -31-
likely to particularly benefit American  suppliers.  Consequently  restoring 
equilibrium  in world  current  accounts  will  require  that  the  United  States 
exports  more  to,  or  imports  less  from,  Europe.  Hence  the  suggestion  that 
further  real depreciation of  the  dollar  against  the  European  currencies  is 
warranted.  At  the  same  time  real  depreciation  of  the  European  currencies 
against  Japan  and  the  NICs  should  partly  offset  the  resulting  loss  in 
European  competitiveness  vis-a-vis  American  producers.  Given  the 
sluggishness  with  which  prices  tend  to  respond  to  quantity  signals,  there 
are  good  reasons  why  the  required  changes  in  relative  prices  are  best 
brought about relatively painlessly through nominal  exchange  rate movements 
rather  than  relying  on  recession  or  inflation  to  generate  domestic  price 
adjustment. 
To  summarise  this  section,  action  to  reduce  the  imbalance  between  the 
budget  deficit  and  the  private  savings  rate  in  the  United  States  is 
required  to  lower  real  interest  rates  and  free  capital  for  other  uses, 
particularly in the  developing countries.  However,  t~is will  do  \ittle to 
solve  the  United  States  current  account  problem  and  faster  growth  by  the 
rest  of  the  OECD,  including  the  Community,  will  do  little  to  help.  Real 
exchange  rate adjustments  are also called for,  and it is likely that recent 
movements  in  real  exchange  rates,  large  as  they  are,  may  turn  out  to  be 
insufficient  and  some  further  real  depreciation  of  the  dollar  against  the 
European  currencies  as  well  as  against  the  Yen  and  the  NICs  will  be 
required. -32-
3.  THE  SHORT-TERM  OUTLOOK 
Sections  1.2-1.3  argued  that  the  stock  market  crash  was  primarily  an 
epiphenomenon  whose  direct  effect  on  activity  would  be  fairly  limited 
provided  that  policy-makers  did  not  repeat  the  mistakes  of  the  thirties. 
Indeed  it  could  have  turned  out  to  be  quite  a  fortuitous  event  if  it 
triggered  the  necessary,  but  much  delayed,  adjustment  in  fiscal  and 
monetary  policies.  However,  the  very  fact  that  the  world  economy  did  not 
collapse  as  some  had  feared  also  runs  the  danger  of  engendering  a 
complacency  that all is well. 
The  immediate  concern after  the  crash was  that  the  United  States  would 
lead  the  rest of  the  world  into  recession,  but  this  was  always  unlikely  in 
an  election year.  Some  slackening  of  the  growth  rate  was  certainly to  be 
expected  as  firms  approach  capacity  working  and  labour  shortages  start 
appearing,  but  there  was  no  reason  for  a  recession  to  develop  so  long  as 
nominal  demand  continued  to  grow  steadily.  While  the  need  for  action  to 
reduce  the  United  States  budget  deficit  is  recognised  almost  universally, 
Congress  and  the  Administration  have  shown  themselves  unwilling  or  unable 
to  act  decisively,  and  it  was  clear  that  no  significant  contraction  in 
fiscal  policy  could  take  place  until  a  new  President  was  installed  in  the 
White  House.  The  fiscal  adjustment  of  $76  billion  over  two  years  agreed 
earlier  this  year,  containing  largely  creative  accounting  exercises,  such 
as  asset sales,  but  no  significant  increases  in taxes  scarcely represented 
a  serious  move  in the  required direction. 
Of  course  there  was  still  the  relatively  small  deflationary  impulse 
coming  from  reduced consumption and  investment,  but this  seems  to have  been 
more  than  adequately  offset  by  the  monetary  expansion  engineered  by  the 
Federal Reserve,  which went beyond that necessary to maintain  the  liquidity -33-
of  the  financial  markets  in  the  wake  of  the  crash.  The  result has  been  a 
fall  in short-term real  interest rates  (see  Table  9)  and  a  further  dollar 
depreciation  which  has  helped  to  sustain  investment ·and  ensure  that  net 
exports  expanded  to fill any  gap  in demand left by  reduced consumption. 
The  political  calculus  dictates  that  the  most  propitious  time  for  a 
President  to  make  inroads  into  the  United  States  budget  deficit  is  in  the 
early part of his presidency.  Thus  if there  is to be action on  the deficit 
it is likely to start in the first half of 1989.  Of  course,  swingeing cuts 
in the deficit would  also be  undesirable  because  attempts  to  eliminate  the 
deficit at  a  stroke  by  cutting  spending  or  raising  taxes  almost  certainly 
would  throw  the  United  States  economy  into  a  deep  recession,  even  if 
monetary  policy  were  simultaneously  relaxed.  The  ideal  would  be  a 
pre-announced  steady  year-by-year  reduction  in  the  deficit  (such  as 
embodied in the British Medium  Term  Financial Strategy)  accompanied by  some 
monetary  expansion  as  required.  The  beneficial  expectational  effects  of 
such  a  strategy on  long interest rates would probably help  significantly to 
cushion  the  adverse  effects of the  cuts  themselves.  The  desire  to  avoid  a 
recession  at  this  time  means  that  some  monetary  relaxation  is  likely  and 
consequently  the  dollar will  come  under  downward pressure next year. 
Of  course,  it  is  possible  that  the  new  president  will  not  take 
immediate  steps  to  close  the  budget  deficit.  But  in  that  case  the 
financial  markets  are  likely  to  start  demanding  an  ever  higher  rate  of 
return  on  American  government  debt  or  else  lending  to  the  government  may 
even  dry  up  completely,  thus  forcing  the  authorities  to  take  action.  The 
adverse  shift in the net supply  of foreign assets will  again be  associated 
with  downward  pressure  on  the  exchange  rate.  Some  monetary  tightening 
would  be  likely  in  order  to  defend  the  dollar,  but  fear  of  provoking  a -34-
domestic  recession will  also  be  an  important  factor  working  in  the  other 
direction,  especially if the current account deficit is still there. 
As  far  as  Europe  is  concerned  in  1988  there  has  been  some  modest 
deflationary  stimulus  coming  from  the  domestic  effects  of  the  stock market 
crash on  consumption and  investment,  worth perhaps  a  a per cent of GNP.  In 
addition  to  this  domestic  demand  shock  there  is  a  further  negative  demand 
shock  coming  from  abroad  as  a  result of  the  increased competitive  pressure 
due  to  the  post-crash  depreciation  of  the  dollar,  worth  perhaps  another  i 
per  cent  of  GNP. 27  But  next  year  there  is  likely  to  be  an  additional 
deflationary  stimulus  coming  from  abroad  as  either  United  States  growth 
slows  in  the  face  of  fiscal  tightening,  or,  more  likely,  the  dollar 
depreciates  as  a  result  of  sympathetic  monetary  loosening  by  the  Federal 
Reserve.  Against  these  adverse  movements  in  competitiveness  must  be 
weighed  any  beneficial  effects  on  the  terms  of  trade  and  thence  onto  the 
wedge  between  producer  and  consumer  prices.  However,  the  beneficial 
effects  on  the  supply-side  are  likely  to  be  relatively  muted  because 
empirical  evidence28  suggests  that  the  dollar  price  of  raw  materials 
responds  to  movements  in  the  dollar with  an  elasticity of  close  to  unity. 
Thus  the  ECU  price  of  raw  materials  is  likely  to  be  relatively unaffected 
by  the  dollar  depreciation.  Since  the  share  of  American  goods  in  the 
European  consumers'  basket  is  also  very  small  the  total  effect  of  the 
dollar  depreciation  on  the  wedge  will  also  be  extremely  small. 
this background what policy options  are  open to  the  Community? 
3.1  THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  EUROPEAN  CO-OPERATION 
Against 
The  most  recent report29 of the  CEPS  macroeconomic  group  emphasised  the 
very  limited  role  for  (fiscal)  policy  co-ordination  amongst  the  major 
trading  blocks  because  of  the  relatively  small  trade  linkages,  but  argued -35-
that  a  co-operative  approach  within  the  Community  greatly  enhanced  the 
effectiveness  of  a  two-handed  strategy  of  fiscal  expansion  aimed  at 
stimulating  supply  at  the  same  time  as  demand  was  increased.  Left  to 
themselves  member  countries  might  not  find  it attractive  to  pursue  such  a 
strategy,  or  else  not  to  pursue  it  with  such  vigour,  because  of  the 
associated worsening  of  their external  positions.  Co-ordinated  expansion, 
by  relaxing  the  external  constraint,  would  increase  the  incentive  for 
member  countries  to  expand,  to  the benefit of all.  At  the  present juncture 
uncoordinated policy makers,  coupled with  an  excessive  regard  to budgetary 
and  current  account  positions,  runs  the  risk  of  converting  a  relatively 
small  adverse  shock into  a  much  larger final effect on  demand  and activity. 
(Readers  familiar with  the  argument  can skip  to  Section 3.2). 
3.1.1 An  Illustrative Exercise 
To  see  how  this might happen  suppose  there  are  just three  countries  in 
the  world:  France;  Germany;  and  the  United  States.  Trade  flows  between 
France  and  Germany  (Europe)  on  the  one  hand  and  the  United  States  on  the 
other  are  small  with  a  very  small  European  (American)  marginal  propensity 
to  import  American  (European)  goods.  However,  trade  links  within  Europe 
are  large  with  a  rather  high  marginal  propensity  in  France  (Germany)  to 
import  German  (French)  goods.  To  make  matters concrete,  let us  assume  that 
of  an  additional  100  dollars  of  spending  in  the  United  States  5  dollars 
goes  on French  goods  and  5  dollars  on German  goods.  Similarly,  of an extra 
100  ECUs  of  spending  in  France  (or  Germany),  only  5  ECUs  goes  on  American 
goods.  By  contrast  each  extra  100  ECUs  of  spending  in  France  increases 
imports  from  Germany by  30  ECUs  and vice versa  (for  some  actual data on  the 
composition  of  trade  flows  between  the  major  countries  see  Table  7).  Let 
us  also  assume  that  the  monetary  authorities  maintain  the  (nominal) 
exchange  rate,  that  financial  markets  are  highly  integrated,  and  that -36-
variations  in  European  activity  and  fiscal  position  have  only  a  small 
effect  on  the  level  of  interest  rates.  Also  assume  that  falls  in  demand 
are  translated  into  falls  in  activity  rather  than  a  decline  in  domestic 
prices  which  is  probably  appropriate  in at least  the  short  run.  Finally, 
assume  that  an  increase  in  (post-tax)  incomes  of  100  ECUs  produces  a  rise 
in consumption of 80  ECUs,  while  the rate of  income  tax is  30  per cent. 
N~w consider  what  happens  if there  is  an  exogenous  fall  in  demand  in 
France  and  Germany  of 1 per cent of their GOP  due  in equal measure  to,  say, 
a  decline  in consumption  and  a  fall  in exports  to  the  United  St~tes.  Then 
the  reduction  in demand  reduces  incomes  and  consumption  in each  country  as 
well  as  imports  from  the  other.  This  reduction  in  exports  from  France  to 
Germany  and vice versa results  in further falls  in activity in each country 
and  so  on.  Because  there  is  minimal  leakage  of  the  reduction  in  demand 
back  onto  American  exports,  the  European  economy  functions  very  like  a 
closed economy  and  the  overall  reduction in activity will  be  roughly  twice 
the  original  deflationary  stimulus,  or  around  1  per  cent  of  GOP  (see 
Appendix  for  details  of  these  calculations).  This  multiplier  of  two  also 
measures  the  effectiveness  - in  the  sense  of  "bang  per  ECU"  - of  any 
co-ordinated countercyclical fiscal  expansion. 
However,  if  policy-makers  in  each  European  country  act  in  isolation 
they  will  ignore  the  beneficial  effects  on  activity  and  welfare  in  their 
partner.  (Note  that  this  is  not  the  same  as  saying  their  ignore  the 
international  repercussions  of  their  decisions,  rather  they  simply  ignore 
effects  on  foreign  activity  in  evaluating  the  benefits  of  fiscal 
expansion.)  In  the  present  example  they  will  evaluate  the  "bang  per  ECU" 
for unilateral fiscal  expansion at around one  and  a  half.  For  a  given cost 
of  fiscal  action,  e.g.  in  terms  of  the  future  debt  burden,  both  countries 
will  therefore  be  inclined  to  reflate  too  little  in  response  to  the ~6) 
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deflationary  shock.  This  is,  of  course,  the  standard  argument  for 
co-ordination  in  policy-making  that  it  internalises  (non-pecuniary) 
externalities  that are  otherwise  ignored - which  was  analysed at  length  in 
the  group's last report. 
Now  suppose  Germany  and  France  in  the  face  of  the  a per  cent  GDP 
deterioration in their current accounts30 respond by cutting back on  demand 
in order  to  restore  the  status  quo  ante.  Since  35  out  of  every  extra  100 
ECUs  of  spending  leaks  abroad it would  look  to  each  country  acting  on  its 
own  as  though  a  t  per  cent  reduction  in  domestic  demand  would  be  called 
for.  However,  the  cut  in demand  in France  exacerbates  the  current account 
position  in  Germany  and  vice  versa.  Given  that  only  5  of  those  35  ECUs 
leaks  abroad  to  the  United  States,  a  massive  5  per  cent  reduction  in 
domestic  demand  in  the  two  European  countries  will  actually  be  needed. 
This  is simply an illustration of the point made  above  that with very small 
marginal  import  propensities  between  Europe  and  the  United  States, 
increased  growth  in  Europe  can  do  very  little  to  solve  the  United  States 
current account problem. 
However,  it is not  only external positions  that  are  affected,  but  also 
the  budgetary  position  as  lower  activity  reduces  taxes  and  raises  budget 
deficits  in Europe.  Suppose  the  governments  of France  and  Germany  instead 
of  acting  to  stabilise  demand,  or  even  merely  doing  nothing,  actively  try 
to  close  the  widening  budget  gap  by  raising  taxes  or  reducing  government 
expenditure.  This  further  reduces  activity  in  each  country  both  at  home 
and  abroad.  In  this  case  the  final  reduction  in  demand  turns  out  to  be 
four  times  the original deflationary stimulus  or  2  per cent of GDP. 
A  final hybrid case,  which is of some  interest,  is when  France  attempts 
to maintain its current account position while  Germany  attempts  to maintain 
its  budgetary  position.  Now,  with  the  given  mix  of  domestic  and  foreign -38-
shocks,  the  resulting falls  in output are  2t  per cent  in France  and  2~ per 
cent in Germany. 
Of  course,  these  figures  are only illustrative and the  analysis  ignores 
important  features.  For  instance  the fall  in activity could be  expected to 
lead to  a  slackening in wage  pressure and  a  reduction in inflation.  This  in 
turn would promote  lower  interest rates and higher  investment as well  as  an 
improvement  in competitiveness.  Note,  however,  that  while  an  improvement 
in  French  competitiveness  vis-a-vis  German  products  may  enhance  French 
activity  it will  tend  to  reduce  Germany  activity.  Europe  as  a  whole  can 
only benefit by  gaining  competitiveness  against  the  United  States,  and  the 
scope  for  this may  be  limited if marginal  import propensities  and  the price 
elasticity  of  exports  and  imports  are  relatively  low  as  suggested  above. 
Most  of the  compensating  increase  in demand  therefore needs  to be  generated 
within  Europe.  Further  the  exercise also  ignores  the  fact  that  reductions 
in  demand  and  profitability  are  likely  to  have  an  adverse  effect  on 
investment which will exacerbate  things  further.  A  fall  in interest rates 
may  do  little to  encourage  new  investment if firms  cannot  be  confident  the 
demand  for  the  output  from  that investment will be  there. 
What  the  exercise  does  show  is  how  easily  a  small  initial  disturbance 
can be magnified  to produce  a  large cumulative effect if countries  that are 
relatively  well-integrated  in  terms  of  trade  flows  act  independently, 
particularly  if policy  moves  in  a  destabilising  manner  in  order  to  meet 
fixed budget or current  account  targets.  There is a  real  danger  that  this 
may  happen  within  Europe.  Policy  decisions  taken  in  isolation  may  seem 
sensible  and  rational,  from  the  perspective  of  that  country,  but  when 
looked  at  from  the  perspective  of  the  Community  as  a  whole  may  prove 
considerably less appropriate. -39-
3.2  WHAT  ARE  THE  CONSTRAINTS  ON  FISCAL  ACTION? 
The  true  internal  (budgetary)  constraint  is  simply  a  solvency 
requirement  that  the  present  value  of  the  government's  future  revenues, 
including  the  revenues  from  seigniorage  and  the  operating  surpluses  of 
nationalised  industries,  should  be  equal  to  the  present  value  of  the 
government's  current  and  capital  spending  programme  plus  its  outstanding 
liabilities.  31  Note  that  this  solvency  constraint  imposes  no  particular 
requirement  on  the year-to-year movements  in actual budget deficits. 
During  recessions,  because  of  limited  access  to  credit  markets,  many 
private  agents  are  likely  to  experience  a  binding  liquidity  constraint. 
There  is  a  presumption  that  the  government,  with  its privileged status  in 
international  financial  markets,  should  in  such  circumstances  act  as  a 
"lender  of  first  resort"  by  borrowing  in  the  stead  of  the  constrained 
private  agents  and  using  the  proceeds  to  relax  private  sector  budget 
constraints  e.g.  via  tax  reductions,  etc.  It  cannot  be  over-emphasised 
that  this  strategy  need  not  conflict  with  "responsible"  fiscal  policy  in 
the  medium  term,  provided  that  relatively  smaller  budget  deficits  are 
maintained during booms.  Indeed countercyclical fiscal policy of this  type 
is  only  likely  to  be  successful  so  long  as  the  government  maintains  a 
reputation  for  fiscal  probity,  otherwise  ~t  is  likely  to  have  an  adverse 
and  potentially  self-defeating  effect  on  the  financial  markets.  But  for 
governments  that  do  have  that  credibility,  there  should  be  no  fear  of 
temporary  increases in the budget deficit during recessions. 
A  simple  indication of  the  degree  of  room  for  manoeuvre  on  the  fiscal 
front  can  be  obtained  by  comparing  the  goverment's  primary  surplus,  i.e. 
the  surplus  excluding  net  interest  payments,  with  the  primary  surplus  it 
would  need  to  run  to  maintain  the  debt-income  ratio  constant  without 
resorting  to  monetary  creation.  This  represents  a  non-inflationary, -40-
indefinitely  sustainable,  fiscal  position  and  so  provides  a  natural 
benchmark,  although,  of  course,  a  government  may  wish  to  move  to  a  lower 
(higher)  debt-income  ratio  in equilibrium which  would necessitate  a  period 
of  higher  (lower)  primary  surpluses.  Because  national  income  is  growing 
over  time  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  primary  surplus  match  the 
government's  nominal  debt  interest payments  to ensure  the  debt-income  ratio 
remains  stable.  Rather  it has  to  match  the  real  interest payments  on  the 
debt,  corrected for  the  growth  in the  denominator  of the  debt-income  ratio, 
namely  income.  Hence  what  matters  in  calculating  the  indefinitely 
sustainable  primary  surplus  is  the  gap  between  the  real  interest  rate  and 
the  rate  of  growth  of  the  economy.  Table  8  provides  estimates  of  this 
sustainable  primary  surplus  measure,  calculated  on  the  conservative 
assumption  that  the  real  interest rate  continues  to  exceed  the  growth  rate 
by  2  percentage points  indefinitely,  together with estimates  of  the  actual 
primary  surplus  in  the  recent  past.  Table  9  gives  the  associated  figures 
for  the net public debt-income  ratio in each country.  Table  8  reveals  that 
the  United  States,  France,  and  Italy  showed  the  biggest  gaps  in  1986 
between  the  actual  primary  surplus  and  that  required  to  stabilise  the 
debt-income  ratio,  while Japan,  Germany  and  the United Kingdom  (especially) 
had  more  room  for  manoeuvre.  It will  be  useful  to  bear  these  figures  in 
mind  when  considering  the  effective  constraints  on  policy  within  the 
Community.  It must  be  emphasised  that  the  required primary  surplus  has  no 
normative  significance  and  there  is  no  reason  why  the  debt-income  ratio 
should  be  kept  constant  from  year-to-year.  The  figures  do,  however,  give 
an  idea  of  the  sort  of  permanent  adjustment  to  the  government's  fiscal 
plans  that would be necessary to ensure  solvency at the  current debt-income 
ratio. -41-
In  the  same  way  the  true  external  constraint  for  a  country  is  just  a 
solvency  condition  that  the  present  value  of  future  trade  deficits  equal 
the  country's  initial  net  foreign  asset  position  rather  than  any 
requirement  that  the  current  account  balance  from  period  to  period.  The 
same  intertemporal  consumption  smoothing  arguments  that  underlie  the  case 
for  consumers  smoothing expenditure  over  time  by borrowing and  lending,  and 
for  the  government  to  act  as  an  agent  for  the  private  sector  by  borrowing 
on their behalf when private agents  cannot,  operate here  as well. 
Thus  if  the  demand  for  exports  falls  temporarily  or  there  is  a 
temporary  reduction  in  supply  e.g.  due  to  a  strike,  a  country  should  be 
quite happy  to  run  a  larger trade deficit/smaller surplus  in order  to  avoid 
having  to  reduce  domestic  consumption  (private  or public)  temporarily.  By 
the  same  token if there  is an  investment boom,  due  to  say an  improvement  in 
expected  profitability,  a  worsening  of  the  trade  balance  is  quite 
appropriate.  Indeed  the  argument  is  even  stronger  here  because  provided 
the  investment  is  sufficiently profitable,  in the  sense  of offering  a  rate 
of  return  at  least  as  great  as  the  market  rate,  it  could  be  financed 
through  trade  deficits  indefinitely  because  the  country  is  continually 
acquiring  assets  to  match  its  increased  foreign  liabilities.  By  contrast 
permanent  changes  in export  demand,  or  in potential output,  will need  to be 
accompanied  by  permanent  changes  in  consumption  and  therefore  do  not 
necessitate movements  in the current account. 
Bearing  these  principles  in  mind,  therefore,  let  us  consider  the 
perceived  constraints  on  policy  action  in  the  four  main  Community 
economies. -42-
3.2.1 France 
French  output  growth  has  been  one  of  the  lowest  in  the  Community  in 
recent  times,  averaging  less  than  1~ per cent since  1982.  Because  of this 
sluggish  growth,  the  public  debt-income  ratio has  risen from  11.3  per  cent 
in  1982  to  20.4  per  cent  today  despite  a  reasonably  modest  government 
financial  deficit  that  has  remained  at  around  2i  per  cent  of  GDP.  While 
the  calculations  of  Table  8  indicate  that  the  debt-income  ratio  will 
continue  to  rise  with  the  existing  fiscal  stance,  the  fact  that  the 
debt-income  ratio  is  still  at  very  low  levels  compared  to  other 
industrialised countries  suggests  that  the  fiscal  elbow  room  is  there  for 
postponing  the  planned  reductions  in  government  spending  and  accelerating 
the  planned  tax  reductions  somewhat  in  the  face  of  a  deflationary  demand 
shock. 
While  the  budgetary position is  relatively  good,  the  external position 
is  more  worrying.  Despite  continued  wage  moderation  and  an  associated 
steady  improvement  in relative unit labour costs,  a  current account deficit 
has  shown  a  repeated  tendency  to  develop.  Therefore  external  rather  than 
internal  considerations  will  provide  the  brake  on  French  countercyclical 
measures.  In  particular  the  authorities  are  likely  to  be  rather 
circumspect  about  pursuing  a  more  expansionary  domestic  economic  policy  in 
view  of the  experience  of 1981-82.  Then  a  unilateral  demand-led  expansion 
quickly  led  to  a  deterioration  of  the  current  account,  pressure  on  the 
franc,  and ultimately a  reversal of fiscal policy rather than quit the  EMS. 
However,  a  very  good  argument  can  be  made  that  the  cause  of  the 
difficulties lay less with the fiscal  expansion itself, but rather with  the 
nature  of  the  policies  that  were  simultaneously  enacted  in  the  labour 
market  - a  sharp  increase  in the  minimum wage,  a  shorter workweek,  and  the 
creation of  a  climate  which  enhanced  the  bargaining  power  of  labour - and -43-
which  had  an  adverse  effect  on  the  supply-side  of  the  economy. 32  A 
supply-side  friendly  fiscal  expansion  need  not  run  into  the  same 
difficulties. 
3.2.2  Germany 
In  the  case  of  Germany  there  is  no  danger  that  expansion  will  be 
limited  by  external  factors.  The  current  balance  in  1987  was  still  a 
massive  3.9 per cent of GDP.  This  figure  does,  however,  hide  the  fact  that 
the  real trade balance  deteriorated markedly  in 1987  as  a  result of the  10 
per  cent  loss  in  competitiveness  in  1986  which  was  offset  by  beneficial 
terms  of  trade  movements.  This  is  just  the  obverse  of  the  fact  that  the 
real  dollar  depreciation has  done  very  little to  reduce  the  United  States 
current  account  deficit  so  far.  Thus  in  1986  and  1987  domestic  demand 
growth  has  been  outstripping  output  growth  by  1. 2  per  cent  each  year  as 
Germany  has  provided  an  external  stimulus  to  her  trading  partners.  Yet 
output  growth  is  so  sluggish  that  there  would  appear  to  be  room  for  even 
faster growth of domestic  demand without risking renewed inflation. 
As  Tables  1,  8  and  9  make  clear,  fiscal  policy  in  the  last four  years 
has  been directed towards  consolidating the public finances  and halting the 
rise  in  the  debt-income  ratio  that  took  place  at  the  start of  the  decade. 
Although still rising,  its rate of  increase  is now  more  modest,  and  in any 
case  stands  at  a  relatively  low  level  compared  to  other  major 
industrialised countries.  It was  hoped  that this  consolidation would have 
beneficial  effects  on  expectations  in  financial  markets  and  thence  onto 
investment.  This  does  not  seem  to  have  materialised  since  private 
investment  has  remained  relatively  sluggish,  averaging  under  1!  per  cent 
growth per annum  since  1984. 
More  recently  the  fiscal  stance  has  become  rather  less  tight  and  the 
1986  and  1988  tax  cuts,  together  worth  about  26  billion marks,  have  added -44-
about  1~  per  cent  to  demand.  However,  as  the  Tables  show,  the  relaxatory 
movement  is  relatively modest,  and  with  a  small  primary  surplus  and  a  low 
debt-income  ratio,  there  is  still  ample  elbow  room  for  fiscal  action. 
Furthermore,  having  invested  a  considerable  amount  of capital  in acquiring 
a  reputation  for  "sound"  budgetary  and  financial  policies,  the  authorities 
are  in  a  particularly  good  position  to  undertake  a  credible  program  of 
counter-cyclical  fiscal  measures  which will  not  have  adverse  expectational 
effects on  the  financial markets. 
The  great  danger,  however,  is  that  slow  growth,  falling  tax  revenues 
and  a  rising  budget  deficit will  lead  to  a  procyclical  tightening  of  the 
public  finances.  Indeed the  government has  already announced its intention 
to  raise  excise  taxes  and  reduce  subsidies  by  10  billion marks  in  fiscal 
year  1989  to  offset  the  fall  in  Bundesbank  profits  (which  appears  in  the 
relevant  definition  of  the  budget  deficit)  due  to  the  decline  in  the 
dollar.  Such  a  procyclical  tightening  could  simply  lead  to  a  vicious 
circle whereby  low  demand  expectations  lead to  low  investment,  low activity 
and  tax revenues,  and necessitate yet higher  tax rates with  further  adverse 
effects  on  both  demand  and  supply.  At  the  same  time  slow  .German  growth 
would  worsen  the  external  positions  of  other  community  countries,  such  as 
France,  and limit the  scope  for  expansionary policies  there. 
3.2.3 Italy 
Output  growth  in  Italy  has  been  a  respectable  2 i  per  cent  per  annum 
over  the  last  three  years  sustained  primarily  by  domestic  (especially 
consumer)  demand  rather  than net exports.  As  a  result  the  current  account 
has  shown  a  tendency  to  weaken  in the  last year  as  Italy has  provided  some 
modest  net  stimulus  to  the  rest  of  the  community.  Indeed  evidence  of 
overheating had already  led  to  tax  increases  in August,  1987,  prior  to  the 
crash. -45-
Yet  the  major  problems  lie  less  on  the  external  side  than  with  the 
public  finances.  With  a  comparatively  high,  and  growing,  net  debt-income 
ratio  of  more  than  100  per  cent  and  a  4  point  gap  between  the  primary 
surplus  and  the  primary  surplus  required  to  stabilise,  let  alone  reduce, 
the  debt-income  ratio  it is  clear  that  there  is  very  little fiscal  elbow 
room available to  the authorities.  Furthermore,  while it is hoped  that the 
recent and planned  (but presently unspecified in nature)  tax  increases will 
reduce  the  budget  deficit by  more  than  1  per  cent  of  GOP,  this  may  prove 
difficult  to  achieve  if there  is  a  pronounced  slowdown  in  the  rest of  the 
Community,  to  add  to  the  domestic  deflationary stimuli  coming  from  the  tax 
increases and any effects of the  stock market  collapse. 
The  necessary  fiscal  retrenchment  will  thus  be  much  easier  to  achieve 
if  activity  is  maintained  by  a  strong  growth  in  net  exports.  In  the 
absence  of that growth  there will be little scope  for  further  fiscal action 
to  sustain activity.  The  only  alternative  would  be  a  monetary  relaxation 
and  a  devaluation  of  the  lira within  the  EMS.  Aside  from  the  fact  that 
such  a  realignment would  probably not be  acceptable under  the  rules  of  the 
EMS,  it would  in  any  case  merely  serve  to  impart  a  further  deflationary 
shock  to  the  rest of the  Community  and  intensify  inflationary pressures  at 
home.  This would very much be  a  second-best outcome  therefore. 
3.2.4 United Kingdom 
The  United  Kingdom  has  been  amongst  the  fastest  growing  countries  in 
the  community,  averaging  the  historically high  rate  of nearly  3l  per  cent 
since  1985  with  especially  fast  growth  of  4~  per  cent  in  1987.  This  has 
been  sustained  by  some  fiscal  relaxation  in  the  form  of  tax  cuts  on  the 
demand  side  coupled with  extremely  rapid productivity  growth  on  the  supply 
side.  Rapid  demand  growth  will  be  sustained  through  1988  as  a  result  of 
tax  cuts  in  the  March  Budget  worth  1  per  cent  -of  GOP  and  a  continued -46-
revival  in private  investment.  Fears  of  overheating  waned  somewhat  in the 
wake  of  the  crash,  but have  been  growing  again as  it has  become  clear that 
growth has  not faltered significantly. 
These  fears  of  overheating  are  primarily  based  on  two  pieces  of 
evidence,  one  valid  and  one  invalid.  The  valid  evidence  of  overheating 
comes  from  data  on  wage  settlements  which  are  averaging  around  8  per  cent 
in manufacturing  compared  to  an  inflation rate  of around  4  per cent.  This 
need  not  presage  a  future  acceleration  in  inflation  provided  that  the 
recent  record  on  productivity  growth  is  maintained.  What  is worrying  is 
that productivity growth  is being turned into higher wages  rather  than more 
jobs,  which  is  necessary  if unemployment  is  to  continue  falling  and  the 
high  levels  of  output  growth  are  to  be  maintained.  This  suggests  the 
desirability of targeting fiscal measures  in a  manner  likely to  lessen wage 
pressure  e.g.  by  selective  cuts  in  labour  taxes  in  regions  where 
unemployment  is highest or directed especially at  the  long-term unemployed, 
rather than in the  form  of general direct tax cuts whose  primary  short-term 
effect is only on  the  level of demand. 
The  other  indicator  of  potential  overheating  is  the  current  account. 
After  a  number  of years  of healthy surpluses  reflecting both  low  levels  of 
domestic activity and earnings  from  North  Sea oil this has  started slipping 
into  deficit  as  British  growth  has  outstripped  her  trading  partners. 
Forecasts  for  the deficit currently range  from  1~ per cent to  3  per cent of 
GDP  for  1988.  However,  unlike  previous  balance  of  payments  crises  in  the 
sixties  and  seventies,  the  present deterioration in  the  current  account  is 
largely a  cyclical rather than structural feature  reflecting the  relatively 
rapid  growth  of  the  economy  and  slow  growth  in  the  rest  of  Europe.  With 
the  recent  excellent  performance  on  the  productivity  front  and  a  large 
stock  of  foreign  assets  accumulated  during  peak  years  of  oil  production, -47-
the  United  Kingdom  is  in  a  good  position  to  run  a  significant  current 
account deficit,  especially since  investment  is booming,  and  thus  impart  a 
demand  stimulus  to  the rest of the  the  Community. 
Past  experience  of  repeated  balance  of  payments  deficits  and  sterling 
crises may  well  lead,  or financial market reaction force,  the  government  to 
pursue  a  more  restrictive  fiscal  policy  in  1989.  Yet  as  can  be  seen  from 
Tables  8  and  9  with  a  falling  debt-income  ratio  and  a  significant  primary 
surplus  there is still a  considerable  amount  of fiscal  elbow  room.  It will 
be  a  great pity if the  opportunity to continue  reducing and  reforming  taxes 
to  the  benefit of both  demand  and  supply,  thus  maintaining  growth  both  at 
home  and  in  the  rest  of  Europe,  is  missed  because  of  unwarranted  fears 
about  the external position. 
3.3  MONETARY  AND  EXCHANGE  RATE  POLICY 
The  immediate  response  of  the  major  central  banks  to  the  stock  market 
crash  was  to  cut  interest  rates  (Table  10)  and  pump  liquidity  into  the 
system  thus  avoiding  any  financial  collapse.  However,  more  recently  the 
direction  of  interest  rate  movements  has  tended  to  be  in  the  other 
direction as  inflation fears  have  replaced fears  of recession.  In fact  the 
general  level of interest rates  is  now  little different  from  that prior  to 
the  crash.  However,  fiscal  retrenchment  in  the  United  States,  when  it 
comes,  is  likely  to  be  associated  with  monetary  relaxation.  With  an 
unchanged  monetary  stance  in Europe  the  result will,  in the  absence  of  any 
concerted  intervention,  be  a  further  decline  in  the  dollar  against  the 
European  currencies,  with  further  consequential  adverse  effects  on  the 
demand  for  Community  output.  We  argued  above  that  suitably  accommodatory 
fiscal policies  - taking cogniscance of countries initial positions33  - can 
negate  this,  without  too  much  difficulty.  However,  an  obvious  question  is -48-
whether  a  more  expansionary  European monetary  policy would  be  a  better way 
to  proceed. 
Our  answer  to  this  is No.  The  reasons  are  two  fold.  First,  the  use  of 
fiscal policy as  the  primary stabilisation tool would enable  governments  to 
simultaneously  attack  problems  on  the  supply  side  of  the  economy  by 
reducing  labour  taxes  and  undertaking  worthwhile  public  sector  investment 
projects.  It  could  be  countered  that  relaxing  monetary  policy  instead, 
while  maintaining  a  tight budgetary  stance,  would  put  downward  pressure  on 
real  interest  rates  and  encourage  investment  thus  also  benefitting  the 
supply  side.  However  the  effect  on  real  interest  rates  should  be 
relatively mild  since  these  are  primarily  determined  in world,  rather  than 
domestic,  capital markets.  Further  the  impact  on  investment  could be  very 
limited if firms  are  not  confident  that  the  demand  for  the  output  of  the 
investment will be  there.  Finally,  any potential financial  crowding-out of 
investment  can  be  avoided  by  ensuring  that  any  fiscal  package  contains 
suitable  inducements  for  investment. 
The  second  reason  is  that  the  primary  consequence  of  an  aggressively 
expansionary  monetary  stance  would  be  to  mitigate  the  depreciation  of  the 
dollar.  As  Section  2  made  clear,  some  further  real  depreciation  of  the 
dollar  against  the  European  currencies  is  required  as  part  of  the  global 
adjustment  process.  Such  a  real  depreciation  can  be  brought  about  either 
through  an  adjustment  of  the  nominal  exchange  rate,  or  a  period  of 
differential inflation (or some  combination of the  two).  Now  inflation,  as 
measured  by  the  GNP  deflator,  in  the  United  States  averaged  around  3  per 
cent  in  1987  and  was  only  about  l  percentage  points  below  the  Community 
average  (and well  above  the  zero  rate  in Japan).  Bringing  about  the  real 
depreciation  through  differential  inflation would  therefore  require  either 
a  marked  deceleration  of  inflation  in  the  United  States,  which  could -49-
probably  only  be  brought  about  by  provoking  a  recession,  or  a  period  of 
significantly  faster  inflation  in  Europe  and  elsewhere,  which  given  the 
heavy  costs  of  disinflation  that  have  already  been  incurred  hardly  looks 
attractive.  It therefore  seems  preferable  for  the  necessary  real  exchange 
rate adjustment  to be brought about relatively painlessly through movements 
in  nominal  exchange  rates  rather  than  through  potentially  painful 
adjustment  in domestic price levels. 
We  should  emphasise  that  we  are  not  arguing  in  favour  of  a  marked 
tightening  of  European monetary  policy.  European  competitiveness  needs  to 
improve  somewhat  against  Japan  and  the  NICs  at  the  same  time  as  it 
deteriorates  against  the  United  States,  so  monetary  and  exchange  rate 
policy needs  to pursue  a  middle  course between these  two  ends. 
There  is  an  important  moral  here  for  whether  there  should  be  renewed 
efforts  to  stabilise  the  nominal  value  of  the  dollar  at  its present  level 
through concerted intervention.  Greater stability of  (real)  exchange  rates 
whether  through  fixed  nominal  rates  or  target  zones  is  a  worthwhile 
ultimate  policy  goal.  Exchange  rate  volatility  raises  uncertainty  and 
discourages  trade  and  specialisation but attempting  to hold  exchange  rates 
at  unsustainable  levels  is  both  costly  and  unlikely  to  succeed.  Theory 
suggests  - and  experience  has  shown  - that  stable  exchange  rates  can  only 
be  maintained  so  long  as  countries  are  willing  to  subordinate  domestic 
policy  objectives  to  external  ones  when  the  two  are  in  conflict.  It 
requires  two  countries  to  stabilise  an  exchange  rate  and  so  long  as  the 
United  States  pursues  a  policy  of  neglect  - whether  benign  or  malign  -
towards  the  dollar,  efforts  to  stabilise  the  dollar  exchange  rate will  be 
doomed  to  failure.  It is better that  the  authorities  allow  the  dollar  to 
find its own  level,  postponing attempts at stabilising exchange rates until 
after the adjustment processes are complete. -50-
This  depreciation of the dollar is likely also  to  lead to pressures  for 
realignments  within  the  EMS  as  dollar  depreciations  have  usually  been 
associated  with  upward  pressure  on  the  mark  relative  to  other  member 
countries'  currencies.34  This  would  probably best be  accommodated  by  some 
mild  relaxation  of  German  monetary  policy  relative  to  that  of  other  EMS 
currencies  rather  than  another  realignment  which  would  lead  to  an 
additional  deterioration  in  German  competitiveness  and  a  further 
deflationary shock to  an  economy which  is already growing  slowly  (although, 
of  course,  the  other  members  of  the  Community  would  benefit  from  the  gain 
in their competitiveness). 
The  practical  conduct  of  monetary  policy  is  likely  to  become  more 
difficult  than  usual  in  the  coming  months.  As  Table  10  shows  that  the 
different monetary  aggregates  within countries  have  often behaved  in quite 
disparate  fashion.  Thus  in  Germany  the  narrow  aggregates  have  grown 
rapidly  while  M3  has  grown  much  more  slowly.  In  France  and  the  United 
Kingdom  the  opposite  is  true.  Conflicting signals  from  different monetary 
aggregates  are  a  perennial  problem  for  the  central  banks,  but  it  is  a 
problem  that  is  likely  to  worsen  rather  than  improve  in  the  near  future. 
Financial  innovation  and  the  development  of  new  financial  instruments  has 
already  encouraged  rapid  growth  of  the  broad  aggregates  in  many  countries 
and  this  is  likely  to  be  augmented  by  increased  demands  for  liquidity  in 
the  wake  of  the  upheavals  in  stock  markets.  Further  fluctuations  in  the 
demand  for  liquidity  are  likely  if  the  volatility  of  financial  markets 
continues.  This  increased  demand  for  liquidity is  simply  a  velocity  shock 
and  should  be  accommodated  since  the  increased  monetary  growth  need  not 
foreshadow  any  acceleration in nominal  GNP  growth or inflation.  This  might 
suggest  that  it could  be  better  to  focus  on  narrower  monetary  aggregates 
which  ought  to  be  largely  immune  from  such  portfolio  shifts.  Here  too, -51-
however,  there  are  problems  - as  the  Bundesbank  has  discovered  - because 
the  successful  recent  disinflation  has  been  associated  with  an  increased 
demand  for  non-interest  bearing  money  as  nominal  interest  rates  have  come 
down.  Again  this  increase  in  demand  should  be  accommodated  as  it 
represents  a  fall  in velocity and carries  no  inflationary implications.  In 
the  light of this,  policy makers,  more  than ever,  should  adopt  a  pragmatic 
approach  and  monitor  a  wide  range  of  indicators,  both  financial  and  real, 
of the likely growth of nominal  GDP  and  the  other objectives of policy,  and 
not  focus  too  closely on movements  in the monetary aggregates. -52-
4.  THREE  SCENARIOS 
It seems  that  the  stock market  crash  did not  represent  a  major  change 
in fundamentals  and its direct effect on  the  OECD  economies  has  been rather 
small.  However,  there  is  a 
necessary  adjustments  to  global 
danger  that  complacency  will  delay 
economic  policies.  Despite  pleas 
the 
for 
fiscal  expansion in Europe  and Japan,  faster  growth  in these  countries  can 
do  relatively  little  to  reduce  the  size  of  the  United  States  current 
account  deficit,  although,  paradoxically,  a  supply-friendly  fiscal 
expansion  is  precisely  what  is  in  Europe's  own  best  interests.  A  real 
depreciation  of  the  dollar  is  also  required  and  it is  likely  that  further 
depreciation  may  yet be  necesary.  The  real  depreciation  that  has  already 
ocurred,  coupled with  the  post-crash monetary  relaxation,  has  ensured  that 
the  United  States  did  not  slip  into  recession,  but  has  imparted  a  further 
small  deflationary  shock  into  the  European  economies,  which  will  be 
magnified  when  the  much  delayed  fiscal  retrenchment  occurs  in  the  United 
States.  We  can sketch out  three possible scenarios. 
Under  the  "optimistic"  scenario,  Germany  eschews  fears  about  growth  in 
government  debt,  and  France  and  the  United  Kingdom  stop  worrying  about  a 
worsening  of  their  current  accounts  and  undertake  fiscal  measures  that 
tackle  supply-side  problems  as  well  as  sustaining  demand.  Cuts  in  labour 
taxes,  worthwhile  public  investment  projects,  and  temporary  subsidies  to 
private  investment  are  a  good  way  of  doing  this.  In  addition by  credibly 
comitting  themselves  to  sustaining  demand  any  collapse  in  private 
investment  is  avoided.  The  dollar  is  allowed  to  fall  to  find  its  own 
equilibrium level while  the  Far  East  currencies  appreciate  relative  to  the 
EMS.  As  a  result  the  imbalance  in  current  accounts  disappears  and 
protectionist pressures  abate. -53-
However  there  is many  a  slip twixt cup  and lip.  What  happens  if things 
do  not  develop  in  this  fashion?  If  it  does  not  come  voluntarily,  then 
fiscal  adjustment  in  the  United  States  will  probably· be  forced  on  the 
authorities  by  the  financial  markets.  Rising  bond  yields  or  a  plumetting 
dollar risk renewing  the  financial  turbulence  seen at the  end  of  1987,  but 
perhaps  with more  profound  consequences  for  the  real  economy.  Whether  the 
fiscal  adjustment  takes  place  in an  orderly manner  or  in  an  atmosphere  of 
crisis,  some  further  real  depreciation  of  the  dollar  will  be  required. 
Members  of  the  Community,  individually  boxed  in  by  budgetary  or  current 
account  concerns,  may  feel  there  is little room  for  generating  more  demand 
domestically  through  fiscal  action. 
stabilise  the  dollar  and  maintain 
On  the  one  hand  they  could  try  to 
competitiveness  through  monetary 
relaxation.  If for mercantilist reasons  the  Far  East  producers  follow  the 
same  policies,  the  result  would  be  a  global  loosening  of  monetary  policy 
and  a  fall  in  real  interest  rates  which  would  at  least  do  something  to 
maintain  the  level  of  world  activity.  However,  it  would  do  little  to 
correct trade  imbalances.  In due  course price adjustment  through deflation 
in the United States and inflation elsewhere might  do  the trick in bringing 
about  the  necessary  change  in  real  exchange  rates,  but  in  the  meantime 
continuing penetration of the  American  market  by  foreign  producers  and  the 
associated  squeeze  on  the  American  tradeable  sector  are  likely  to 
exacerbate  protectionist  pressures.  The  protectionist  lobby  is  already 
fairly  influential  within  the  Democratic  party  and  if American  producers 
see  themselves  as  barred  from  entering  foreign  markets  a  reciprocal  slide 
into  protectionism  is all  too  easily possible.  This  systemic  interaction 
between  macroeconomic  policies  and  the  trade  regime  represents  the  single 
greatest threat on the horizon. Alternatively  European 
decline  of  the  dollar. 
-54-
policymakers  might  acquiesce  in  a  renewed 
This  would  at  least  moderate  protectionist 
pressures  by  accelerating  correction  of  current  account  imbalances. 
However,  in the  absence  of fiscal  action within  Europe,  growth  would  slow, 
further  tightening  the  budgetary  and  current  account  constraints  facing 
member  countries.  Now  there  is  the  danger  that  German  worries  over  the 
budget  deficit  and  French  and  British  concerns  about  the  current  account 
result in a  procyclical fiscal contraction that amplifies  the  small  initial 
deflationary  shock  and  drags  the  rest  of  the  Community  into  a  recession, 
raising  unemployment  to  yet  higher  levels.  Recent  European  experience 
suggests  that  once  unemployment  has  risen  it may  be  difficult  to  get  it 
down. 
Neither  of  these  "pessimistic"  scenarios  are  very  pleasant  to 
contemplate.  One  naturally  hopes  that  the  "optimistic"  scenario  is  the 
most  likely.  However,  the  downside  risk remains. -55-
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APPENDIX:  THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  INTRA-EUROPEAN  CO-ORDINATION 
Let  the  demand  for  output  (Y)  in  the  United  States  (US),  France  (F), 
and Germany  (G)  be  given by: 
(1)  yUS  - c(l-t)YUS  +  m*(YF+yG)  _  2m*yUS  +  zUS  +  GUS 
(2)  yF  - c(l-t)YF +  myG  +  m*yUS  - (m+m*)YF  +  zF +  GF 
(3)  yG  - c(l-t)yG +  mYF  +  m*yUS  - (m+m*)yG  +  zG  +  GG, 
where  c(-0.8)  is the  common  marginal propensity to  consume 
t(-0.3)  is the  common  marginal  tax rate 
m(-0.3)  is the marginal propensity of France  (Germany)  to 
import  from  Germany  (France) 
m*(-0.05)  is the marginal propensity of the United States to 
import  from  each European country and vice versa. 
Z - ZD  +  ZT  is a  shift variable comprising an autonomous  domestic  component 
(ZD)  and  a  foreign  component  (ZT)  and  G  is  government  expenditure.  The  Z 
variables  also  capture  the  effects  of  changes  in  interest  rates  and  real 
I 
exchange  rates,  which  have  been  formally  suppressed  in  order  to  focus  on 
the trade linkages. 
Simple  algebra  then establishes that: 
where  s  - 1-c(l-t)  (-0.44)  is the  economy's  marginal propensity to save. 
For  simplicity  assume  that United  States  output  is held  fixed  so  that 
any  spillover  onto  United  States  exports  from  activity  in  Europe  is -62-
neutralised  by  appropriate  policy  action. 
~Z =  ~zF =  ~zG produces  a  change  in demand  of: 
Then  a  common  shock 
(6)  ~yF =  ~yG- {(s+2m+m*)/([(s+m+m*)2-m2]}~Z- 2.04~2. 
By  contrast the  domestic multiplier on  a  unilateral fiscal action is  simply 
{(s+m+m*)/[(s+m+m*)2-m2]}- 1.48 
The  (real)  trade balance  for  France  and Germany  is: 
(7) 
(8) 
where  ZT  denotes  those  elements  of  Z  associated with  foreign  trade.  Thus 
in  the  face  of  a  common  external  shock  ~ZT =  ~Zt =  ~Z~,  and  given  the 
symmetric  structure  of  France  and  Germany,  it  follows  that,  if  the  trade 
position is to be maintained: 
(9)  ~yF - ~yG - ~ZT/m* - 20~ZT. 
The  budget deficit  (BD)  for  France  and  Germany  is: 
(10) 
(11) 
where  G  is  government  spending.  Maintaining  the  budgetary  position  by 
cutting  government  spending  requires  that  ~GF =  t~YF  and  ~GG - ~yG. 
Simple  algebra  again  establishes  that  for  a  common  domestic  or  foreign 
shock,  ~Z,  the resulting change  in output is given by 
(12)  ~yF =  ~yG =  {(s'+2m+m*)/[(s'+m+m*)2- m2]}~Z- 4~Z 
where  s'  =  1-c  (-0.2). -63-
Finally,  suppose  France  maintains  its  current  account  position  while 
Germany  maintains  its  budgetary  position.  Slightly  more  complicated 
algebra  shows  that if the  common  shock  is  entirely  domestically  generated 
(~Zo - ~zg - ~zB)  then: 
(13)  ~yF- {m/[(s'+m+m*)(m+m*)- m2]}~z0 - 2.93~Zo 
(14)  ~yG- {(m+m*)/[(s'+m+m*)(m+m*)  - m2]}~Zo- 3.41~Z0 . 
By  contrast  if  the  common  shock  comes  entirely  from  abroad 
(~ZT - ~Zt - ~Z~)  the corresponding expressions  are: 
(15)  ~yF- {(s'+2m+m*)/[(s'+m+m*)(m+m*)  - m2]}~ZT- 8.29~ZT 
(16)  ~yG- {(2m+m*)/[(s'+m+m*)(m+m*)  - m2]}~ZT 
When  the  shock  originates  both  at  home  and  abroad,  these  two  sets  of 
expressions  can just be  combined with appropriate weights. -64-
TABLE  1 
Fiscal surpluses  (%  of GNP/GDP)  and private savings  ratios 
1980  1982  1984  1986  1987 
United States 
Budget  surplus  -1.3  -3.5  -2.8  -3.5  -2.4 
Federal budget  surplus  -2.3  -4.6  -4.5  -4.8  -3.4 
Structural budget surblusa  -0.5  -0.9  -1.7  -2.9  -2.0 
Private  savings  ratio  17.8  18.1  15.9  15.9  14.2 
Japan 
Budget  surplus  -4.4  -3.6  -2.1  -1.1  -0.2 
Structural budget surblusa  0.2  1.5  3.0  4.2  4.9 
Private savings  ratio  28.9  28.1  27.7  27.8  28.5 
France 
Budget  surplus  0.0  -2.8  -2.7  -2.9  -2.3 
Structural budget  surblusa  1.6  0.2  0.7  1.3  2.0 
Private savings  ratio  18.0  18.7  18.4  19.2  18.3 
Germany 
Budget  surplus  -2.9  -3.3  -1.9  -1.7  -1.7 
Structural budget  surblusa  -0.2  1.4  4.0  4.3  4.0 
Private savings ratio  20.1  21.5  21.0  22.5  19.7 
Italy 
Budget  surplus  -8.5  -11.3  -11.7  -11.6  -10.6 
Structural budget surblusa  1.1  -2.3  0.3  -0.1  0.3 
Private savings ratio  27.1  28.6  28.7  28.5  26.7 
United Kingdom 
Budget  surplus  -3.5  -2.5  -3.9  -2.7  -1.4 
Structural budget  surblusa  2.1  6.5  5.2  5.3  5.6 
Private savings ratio  20.6  18.4  19.8  17.7  17.2 
Notes 
a  Cumulated change  in OECD  measure  of structural budget  surplus  (1979-0) 
b  Sum  of private  investment rate,  government  financial deficit and current 
account surplus. 
Sources 
OECD  Economic Outlook,  IMF  Financial Statistics,  and European  Econo~. -65-
TABLE  2 
Current balances  (%  of gdp/gnp)  and effective exchange  rates  (1970-100) 
1980  1982  1984  1986  1987 
United States 
Current balance  0.1  -0.3  -2.8  -3.3  -3.6 
Effective exchange  rate  80.1  94.5  103.6  87.6  77.8 
Japan 
Current balance  -1.0  0.6  2.8  4.4  3.6 
Effective exchange  rate  139.2  146.8  169.7  227.6  249.0 
France 
Current balance  -0.6  -2.2  -0.2  0.4  -0.5 
Effective exchange  rate  94.8  83.4  76.8  80.3  80.2 
Germany 
Current balance  -1.9  0.6  1.3  4.2  3.9 
Effective exchange  rate  155.7  159.3  167.7  185.9  196.9 
Italy 
Current balance  -2.2  -1.5  -0.5  0.5  -0.1 
Effective  exchange  rate  49.6  42.6  40.2  39.4  39.5 
United Kingdom 
Current balance  1.3  1.5  0.5  0.0  -0.4 
Effective exchange  rate  72.5  71.9  64.6  59.8  58.9 
Source 
OECD  Economic  Outlook -66-
TABLE  3 
Stock market movements 
Percentage  change  in index end-December  1987  from: 
End-September  1987  End-December  1986 
United States  -27  -4 
Japan  -13  +16 
France  -30  -29 
Germany  -35  -39 
Italy  -24  -32 
United Kingdom  -31  0 
Hong  Kong  -50  -21 
Source 
Morgan  Guaranty,  World Financial  Markets. -67-
TABLE  4 
Survey-based industrial confidence  indicator 
1987  1988 
Q3  Oct  Nov  Dec  Jan  Feb  Mar 
France  -6  -2  -4  -1  0  -1  -2 
Germany  -12  -9  -8  -9  -11  -10  -8 
Italy  -1  2  0  1  1  1  2 
United Kingdom  14  19  20  17  21  18  17 
EC  -3  0  0  0  1  0  0 
Derived  from  survey  questions  on  production,  orders,  stocks  and  prices. 
A positive movement  indicates an  improvement  in confidence. 
Source 
European  Economy,  Supplement  B. -68-
TABLE  5 
Current account of Asian NICs  ($  billion) 
Source 
Korea 
Taiwan 
Hong  Kong 
Singapore 
OECD  Economic  Outlook. 
1985 
-0.9 
9.2 
1.7 
0.0 
1986 
4.6 
16.2 
1.6 
0.5 
1987 
9.8 
18.2 
1.8 
0.2 Source 
-69-
TABLE  6 
Real  exchange  rates of major  OECD  countries  and  the Asian NICs 
(1980-82  Average  =  100) 
1981  1983  1985  1987 
United States  99.8  114.9  123.3  96.5 
Japan  104.7  100.4  104.2  132.0 
Germany  96.2  100.6  95.7  108.6 
Korea  100.3  97.6  89.2  75.1 
Taiwan  101.8  94.6  94.6  92.6 
Hong  Kong  98.7  95.0  103.5  89.6 
Singapore  102.0  101.8  95.7  74.1 
Morgan  Guarantee,  World Financial  Markets -70-
TABLE  7 
Structure of community  trade  in 1986 
Exports  (%  of GNP)  Imports  (%  of GNP) 
To  rest of  To  North  To  rest  To  rest of  To  North  To  rest 
Europe  America  of World  Europe  America  of World 
Germany  18.9  3.1  5.1  14.8  1.4  5.0 
France  11.2  1.4  4.2  12.9  1.2  3.9 
Italy  10.6  1.9  3.7  11.1  1.1  4.5 
United Kingdom  11.1  3.2  5.0  14.7  2.9  5.3 
Source 
European  Economy,  November  1987. 
Europe  includes  non-Community  Europe. -71-
TABLE  8 
General  government  primary and required primary surpluses 
1980  1982 
United States  1.0  -0.7 
Japan  -3.0  -1.7 
France  1.4  -1.1 
Germany  -1.7  -1.5 
Italy  1.9  2.7 
United Kingdom  3.1  3.7 
Source 
1984 
0.4 
-0.1 
-1.0 
-0.2 
0.0 
1.3 
1986 
-1.1 
0.5 
-1.3 
0.1 
-2.6 
1.7 
Required 
Primary 
Surplus 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.5 
2.1 
0.9 
World  Bank,  World Development Report,  October  1987  and author's 
calculations. 
The  required primary surplus  is the  primary surplus  required to keep 
the  debt-income  ratio constant without seigniorage.  It is constructed 
assuming  a  gap between  the  real interest rate and  the  growth rate of 
2  pecentage points. -72-
TABLE  9 
Net  debt of general  government  (%  of GNP/GDP) 
1980  1982  1984  1986  1987 
United States  19.5  21.4  24.1  28.8  29.9 
Japan  17.3  23.2  26.9  26.2  26.6 
France  9.1  11.3  15.2  18.5  20.4 
Germany  14.3  19.8  21.7  22.2  23.0 
Italy  61.8  73.4  87.8  99.2  103.9 
United Kingdom  48.0  46.4  48.5  46.9  46.1 
Source 
OECD,  Economic  Outlook,  June  1987. -73-
TABLE  10 
Short and  long interest rates 
1987  1988 
Sept  Nov  Jan  Mar  May 
United States 
Short  6.9  5.4  5.8  5.9  6.7 
Long  9.6  9.2  8.3  9.4  9.5 
Japan 
Short  3.9  3.9  3.9  3.8  3.8 
Long  5.7  5.1  4.7  4.5  4.7 
France 
Short  7.9  8.6  8.1  8.3  7.6 
Long  10.5  9.8  9.5  9.5  9.1 
Germany 
Short  4.0  3.7  3.3  3.4  3.5 
Long  6.8  6.2  6.2  6.2  6.6 
United Kingdom 
Short  10.3  8.9  8.7  8.7  7.7 
Long  10.7  9.6  9.8  9.4  9.5 
Source 
Goldman  Sachs,  International  Economics  Analyst,  June. -74-
TABLE  11 
Monetary  and nominal  income  growth 
Growth  over last year 
Narrowa  Broadb  Nominal 
United States  3.4  6.1 
Japan  8.9  11.4 
France  0.4  7.3 
Germany  9.8  6.3 
United Kingdom  6.2  15.8 
Source 
Goldman  Sachs,  International  Economics Analyst,  June. 
a 
b 
Ml  except  MO  in United Kingdom. 
M3  in United States,  Germany  and United Kingdom 
M2  in France,  M2  +  CDS  in Japan. 
GNP  (1987) 
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FIGURE  1  :  STOCK  AND  BOND  PRICES  (JAN  1984=  1  00) 
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FIGURE  1  (CONT.)  STOCK  AND  BOND  PRICES  (JAN  1984=  1  00) 
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FIGURE  2:  Growth  Rate  of  US  Non-Durable  and 
Services  Consumption  Expenditure 
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FIGURE  3:  US  COMPETITIVENESS  MEASURES 
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